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CHAPTER 1 . INTRODUCTION 
Developing countries are facing many economic problems 
and are trying to overcome such burdens as low per capita 
income , low productivity, inflation and internal and external 
imbalances, to name but a few. Sub-Saharan Africa, in 
particular, faces serious economic and agricultural problems. 
The severe drought and famine that hit the area between 1983 
and 1985 have forced many of these countries to recognize the 
need for economic change, especially in the agricultural 
sector on which most of the Sub-Saharan countries depend. 
Agricultural policies, although not the only factors that 
have contributed to the poor agricultural production in these 
countries, have had a substantial effect on reducing farmers' 
incentives to produce. Low producer prices and government 
intervention in marketing, input allocation, under-investment 
in agriculture, and inappropriate macroeconomic and trade 
policies have exacerbated the chronic production problems . 
This has weakened the countries' ability to cope with negative 
natural shocks such as drought (Christensen, 1987). 
In most countries, there is a general recognition that 
the situation prevailing in agriculture for the last decade 
and the economic environment that has existed for the last 
five or six years must be changed. In 1985, both the Economic 
Commission for Africa's Joint Economy Report on Africa and the 
Organization for African Unity (OAU) stressed the importance 
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of agriculture, the role of mistaken policies in decreasing 
agricultural output, maintaining inefficient parastatal 
structures and diminishing incentives for private business. 
In order to stimulate economic growth, governments need to 
reform their policies (Christensen, 1987) . 
The government policies that affect the agricultural 
sector take two forms: sector-specific policies and 
macroeconomic policies. These policy instruments are employed 
by both developed and developing nations according to their 
respective objectives. The sector-specific policies are 
policies directed at the agricultural sector. The 
macroeconomic policies are nonagriculture specific policies 
that affect the agricultural sector indirectly (Krueger, 
Schiff and Valdes, 1988). Studies have shown that the effects 
of macroeconomic policies tend to have larger impacts than 
sector-specific policies, on the agricultural sectors of most 
developing countries (Scandizzo and Bruce, 1980). 
The government intervention policies have been encouraged 
by some development theories that regard industrialization as 
the path to economic growth and development . Interventions 
are believed to be necessary in order to transfer surplus from 
the agricultural sector to the industrial sector, erroneously 
expecting no effect on agricultural production due to the 
assumed inelasticity of both the long-run and the short-run 
supply (Scandizzo and Bruce, 1980 ) . Governments also 
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intervene to protect import-competing firms and incomes of 
workers . Furthermore, externalities and market failures exist 
in developing countries and interventions are used to counter 
these conditions. Export taxes are sources of revenue to the 
government. Certain groups in developing countries, such as 
the urban elite put pressure on the government to keep prices 
low and governments implement certain policies t o achieve this 
goal . 
Despite the various reasons given by countries, studies 
have shown that market interventions have not served their 
purpose (Scandizzo and Bruce, 1980 ). Studies by the Wo rld 
Bank in different countries (Argentina, Egypt , Kenya, etc.) 
have concluded that t here is extensive intervention with 
market forces by governments in deve loping countries . This 
has resulted in adverse terms of trade for agriculture, 
inefficiency and income distribution effects (Scandizzo and 
Bruce, 19 8 O) . 
The Sudan is not an exception to this. Despite the 
importance of agriculture to the Sudanese economy, its 
contribution has been declining and the Sudan is now faced 
with chronic economic problems . The poor performance of 
agriculture is attributed t o a number of factors including 
shortage of modern inputs, problems of transport , credit, 
marketing and storage and institutional organizational 
problems . Some agricultural policies have also contributed 
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substantially to the difficulties faced by the Sudanese 
economy (Abdel Salam, 1986). 
The purpose of this study is to i nvestigate the extent of 
government interventions on agricultural market forces in the 
Sudan and the effect of their intervention on producer 
incentives , production and the prices of major agricultural 
crops. In order to understand the extent of government 
interventions and their effect on the agricultural sector, 
this study will look at the agricultural sector in the Sudan 
and some of the policies implemented by the government since 
the early 1970's. It wi ll then attempt to measure the extent 
of these interventions using the nominal rate of protection 
and the effective rate of protection. The latter is a measure 
of the effects of the protective measures, not only on traded 
outputs , but also on traded inputs. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter is divided into three main sections . The 
first section reviews the theory of protection with e mphasis 
on the effective rate of protection (ERP) . The second section 
offers some empirical studies of ERP carried out in various 
developing countries . The last section reviews a study of 
protection and government intervention in the case of the 
Sudan . 
I ntroduction 
Studies on government interventions in the agricultural 
sector in developing countries and their effect o n the 
economy, have s ho wn that these policies are, generally 
speaking, directed toward certain goals. First, in accordance 
with s o me development theories, developing countries have 
attempted to develop the industrial sector at the expense of 
the agricultural sector through policies of import 
substitution and protection of import - competing industries . 
Resources that could have been used economically in the 
agricultural sector are directed toward industrialization; the 
assumption being that such a diversion of agricultural surplus 
does not reduce agricultural output due to the inel asti c ity of 
supply of agricultural products. Second, exchange rate 
controls and import restriction policies have been exercised 
to maintain overvalued exchange rates. Third, government 
procurement policies, export taxation and export quotas have 
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kept agricultural producer prices low. These policies have 
also been used wi th the aim of increasing government revenues 
and stabilizing prices (Krueger, Schiff and Valdes, 1988). 
Fourth, pressure groups in developing countries have succeeded 
in forcing the government to keep prices low; a disincentive 
for producers. This urban bias in policy making has "kept 
food prices artificially low in order t o benefit politically 
powerful urban population" (Bale, 1985). Fifth, governments 
have attempted to provide incentives to producers by 
subsidizing input prices and investing in capital inputs 
(Krueger , Schiff and Valdes, 1988) . Furthermore, it is argued 
that developing economies are distorted and government 
intervention is required "to offset externalities and to 
rectify market failures" existing in these economies (Bale, 
1985 ) . 
The government policies affecting the agricultural sector 
can be divided into two: sector-specific policies and 
macroeconomic policies. Sector- specific policies are directed 
at the agricultura l sector in the form of administered prices, 
export taxes and subsidies, import tariff and nontariff 
barriers, input and credit subsidies and the r ole of the 
government in the form of state trade and marketing boards. 
The macroeconomic policies are nonagriculture specific 
p o licies such as monetary, fiscal trade and exchange rate 
p o licies (Krueger, Schiff and Valdes, 1988 ) . 
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Studies have shown that these market interventions have 
at best, not achieved their goals and at worse, led to a 
decline in economic conditions in developing countries. The 
macroeconomic policies tend to have larger impacts on the 
agricultural sector of most developing countries than the 
sector-specific policies (Scandizzo and Bruce, 1980). 
Gove rnment agricultural and macroeconomic policies can 
affect the agricultural sector in t wo ways . Agricultural 
activities are either protected or taxed by these policies. 
Protection of agricultural products provides an incentive for 
producers to produce; taxation provides a disincentive. One 
way to measure the extent of government protection or taxation 
of certain economic activities is through the calculation of 
the nominal rate of protection and the effective rate of 
protection which wil l be discussed in the following section. 
The Effective Rate of Protection 
In their study of protection , traditional trade theories 
have concentrated on trade in final goods. Using the nominal 
tariff theory and the measurement of the nominal rate of 
protection (NRP) , they have considered only the effect of 
tariffs on final products. The NRP may be defined as the 
percentage increase in domestic price over the world market 
price as a result of the application of protective measures 
(Balassa , 1971 ) . In the traditional model, which assumes a 
small country case with two traded goods and t wo primary 
8 
factors , a tariff on a good would lead to a rise in the 
nominal value of the output of the protected good, a rise in 
the use of the primary factors and a rise in the nominal and 
real value added (Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1973) 
where 
P~: domestic price of commodity i 
P,b: border price equivalent of commodity i, measured at the 
official exchange rate. 
Extensions of the model to more than t wo primary factors 
and traded goods and the imposition of more than one tariff 
change the results in some form or another. For example, in a 
model with more than two traded goods and more than t wo 
primary factors , a tariff on one good will result in an 
increase in output and nominal value of output. These results 
cannot be affirmed in the case where there is more than one 
tariff imposed (Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1983). 
However it is important to consider trade in intermediate 
goods and raw materials since this includes other factors that 
determine the measure of protection , thus changing the results 
of the NRP measures in some cases . Tariffs and other 
intervention measures not only affect output but also inputs. 
Thus, there has been an increasing focus on the protection 
resulting from the protective structure on the domestic value 
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added in various productive activities (Bhagwati and Sriniva-
san, 1983). The effective rate of protection (ERP) is the 
measure that takes into consideration the traded inputs. 
Definition 
Corden (1966) defines the effective rate of protection as 
"the percentage increase in value added per unit in an 
economic activity which is made possible by the tariff 
structure relative to the situation in the absence of tariff 
but with the same exchange rates." 
Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1973) present two basic 
definitions of the ERP. One definition, the Carden-Anderson-
Naya definition defines the ERP as the proportionate increment 
in value added per unit output over the free trade value added 
per unit output. 
n n 
ERP= <E Pid! E Pt'Yi) -1 
i•l i • l 
where 
y,: net output of good i at unit level of activity involving 
n internationally traded goods 
p~: domestic price of good i 
p:: world price of good i 
This definition considers only the traded goods com-
ponents of a productive activity. Nontraded inputs and outputs 
are either considered as part of the value added or they are 
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assumed to be non-existent. 
Another definition is the Corden - Leith definition which 
considers separable production functions relating output to 
intermediate and primary factors. 
o ==G ( e (F) , M l 
where 
Q: output 
M: intermediate factors 
F: primary factors 
G: concave and homogeneous of degree 1 in 0 and M 
0: homogeneous of degree 1 and concave in F 
The Corden-Leith definition defines the ERP as the propor-
tionate change in the "price of value added" due to protection 
(Bhagwat i and Srinivasan, 1973) . 
Balassa (1971) defines the ERP as the percentage increase 
in domestic value added resulting from the imposition of 
tariffs and other protective measures on the product a nd its 
inputs, over the world market value added. This definition, 
similar to Corden's definition (Corden, 1966), relates the 
value added in the presence of a tariff structure to the value 
added in the absence of tariffs. Thus the ERP does not only 
depend on the tariff on the commodity produced but also on the 
input coefficients and the tariff on the inputs. 
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The Theory of the Effective Rate o f Protection 
Corden (1966) provi des the general equilibrium implica-
tions of t he ERP concept . Certain assumptions are made in the 
theory o f ERP. (1) Physica l input-outpu t coefficients are 
held fixed and ( 2 ) the elasticities of demand for exports and 
supply of imports are assumed t o be infinite. (3) Tradable 
goods are assumed to remain traded after the imposition of 
t ariffs, t axes and subsidies suc h that the d omestic price of 
each i mpo rtable is the foreign price plus the tariff . ( 4) 
Total expenditure is assumed to be equal to full employment 
income through appropriate fiscal a nd monetary policies. (5) 
There are no discriminatory trade taxes (including tariffs) 
and subsidies between expo rting and importing countries 
(Corden, 1966). Corden's objective is to determine the 
effec ts of a tariff structure on resource allocation. 
Corden (1966 ) takes a simple case of one importable 
product j and one importable input i (later extended to 
i ncl ude exportables) . 
where 
v,: valu e added per unit of j in activity j in the absence 
tariffs 
vj , : value added per unit o f j in activity j in the presence 
of tariffs 
of 
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with VJ = pj (1 - aij ) 
and VJ~= pJ [(1 + tj) - aij (1 + t, ) ] 
where 
p : price of a unit j in the absence of tariffs 
a~: share of i in cost of j in absence of tariffs 
t j : net effect on tariff or export subsidy and any 
production tax on industry j 
t,: net effect of tariff or export subsidy on input i with 
any consumption tax on industry j 
Thus the ERP for traded goods may be expressed as 
This can be extended to include many importable and exportable 
outputs and inputs into any product j, with the exclusion of 
nontraded inputs. 
n n 
ERP= ( t 1-,E a11 t 1 ) I ( 1-E a11) 
l • l i•l 
For exportables, an export subsidy is the equivalent of a 
tariff f o r importables, i.e., it raises the internal price of 
a product and an export tax is the equivalent of an import 
subsidy. The absence of nontraded inputs is sti l l assumed. 
Taking into consideration consumption and production 
taxes and subsidie s, in the equation, only net effects of 
tariffs and export subsidies are c onsidered. This results fro m 
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the fact that consumption taxes on finished goods do not 
affect ERPs. Consumption taxes on inputs have the same effect 
as tariffs on inputs, i.e. , they increase input costs and as a 
consequence decrease ERPs. Production taxes on goods, on the 
other hand, like import subsidies or export taxes , reduce 
ERPs. Production taxes on inputs reduce protection for the 
input but have no effect on ERP for t he industry (Corden, 
1966 ) . 
The ERPs can be equal to zero or take positive or 
negative values . Positive ERP indicates that the value added 
per unit at domestic prices is greater than what prevails in 
the international market and at a parity rate of exchange . 
This means that the industry is protected, that is , government 
policies encourage the expansion o f the product through a 
positive ERP . The opposite is true for the case of a negative 
ERP. Domestic value added is less than that which prevails in 
the international market (in a free trade situation ) and thus 
production is discouraged (Bale, 1985 ) . The ordering of the 
ERPs on a scale shows t he direction in which resou rces are 
pulled between activities producing traded goods as a result 
of protective policies. Assuming normal nonzero substitution 
elasticities in production, this results in the reallocation 
of resources from lower protection industries to higher 
protection industries, depending on the rate of factor 
mobility (Valdes, 1973 ) . This is the pro duction effect o f t he 
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protective structure which depends on the scale of ERP and on 
production substitution elasticities. 
The ERP can also be compared to the NRP. An ERP that is 
larger than the NRP indicates that subsidization of inputs has 
offse t the taxation of the output. When ERP and NRP estimates 
are approximately equal, this indicates that the prices of 
nontraded inputs have been rising faster that prices of the 
traded inputs (Dethier, 1988). 
The Net Effective Rate of Protection (NERP} 
Since the analysis of the ERP deals with comparisons 
between domestic and international prices, the question of the 
appropriate exchange rate to be used arises. With the 
presence of tariffs, an exchange rate that is lower than that 
which prevails in a free trade situation, may be required to 
maintain a balance of payment (BOP} equilibrium. As a result 
of lower exchange rates, prices of imports are lower and the 
extent of protection declines. Thus the exchange rate under 
protection tends to be overvalued. This understates the 
discrimination against exports and overstates the extent of 
protection (Balassa, 1971). 
Corden (1966} introduces a nontraded good, with the 
assumption of constant price,into the analysis; in the general 
case of many nontraded goods, an average price level is 
assumed to be held constant. Resources would move toward 
protected industries and away from the nontraded good and away 
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from taxed industries and toward the traded good. In the case 
of consumption, demand would move toward the nontraded good 
from goods with positive nominal rates and the reverse is true 
for goods with negative nominal rates. This would lead to 
internal imbalance {excess demand for or supply of nontraded 
good) and external imbalance {balance of payments surplus or 
deficit) since we assume aggregate expenditure is maintained 
at full employment income. An exchange rate adjustment is 
needed to maintain external and internal balance, assuming 
significant production-substitution and consumption-
substitution relationships among traded and nontraded goods. 
A balance of payments {BOP) surplus and excess demand for 
nontraded goods requires exchange rate appreciation to restore 
the balance. This provides a negative ERP for traded goods 
{Corden, 1966). 
The net effective rate of protection (NERP ) adjusts for 
overvaluation of exchange rate compared to the free trade 
situation (Balassa, 1971) . The exchange rate adjustment in 
the calculation of the ERP i.e., NERP, when compared to the 
ERP will provide a measure of the incentive or disincent ive to 
production contributed by the exchange rate (Bale, 1985 ) . 
Corden (1966) states that the NERP " indicates the full effects 
of a protective rate structure on resource allocation" i.e., 
whether an activity is protected or taxed relative to 
nontradables. The extent to which the exchange rate is 
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adjusted depends on the domestic and foreign elasticities of 
the demand and supply of tradables. The exchange rate 
adjustment provides the macroeconomic effect of government 
po licies. Thus the ERP adjusted for e xc hange rate 
overvaluatio n will give the t o tal protection . To determine 
the direction of change in value added , the protection 
relative to both the nontraded g oods and other traded goods is 
taken into consideration (Carden, 1966). 
Nontraded Inputs 
The nontraded sector is affected in three ways by the 
protective structure . Positive protect ion of traded goods 
leads to additional demand for nontraded inputs; demand will 
divert from finished traded goods with positive nominal 
tariffs o r export subsidies to nontraded goods; the protected 
traded goods industries will attract the primar y factors a way 
from the non traded sector (Corden, 1966) . 
With the introduction of non traded inputs into the model, 
an import ant question arises as to how to treat these 
nontraded inputs . When an industry is protected, there is an 
increased demand f or nontraded inputs . Nontraded inputs c an 
be treated in either of t wo ways. One way is to treat them as 
any tradable input with zero duties. The second way is to 
treat them as primary factors o r as value added by primary 
i nputs (Bruno, 1972) . Treatment of nontraded inputs as 
t radable i npu ts arises from defining ERP as t h e effect o f 
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tariff structure on value added. To obtain value added, all 
inputs, whether traded or nontraded, should be excluded . 
Treatment of nontraded inputs as primary factors is explained 
by the fact that the protection of traded goods represents 
protection f o r primary factors and industries producing 
nontraded inputs used in the production of the traded goods. 
According to Corden (1966), nontraded inputs should be 
treated as primary factors and not as traded inputs. This is 
based on the fact that nontraded inputs do not have infinite 
elasticities such that increasing their quantities wil l l ead 
to higher costs and this violates one of the assumptions of 
the protective structure. Thus comparing protection of traded 
goods relative to nontraded goods does not mean the inclusion 
of all nontraded goods since protection will have led to 
increase in relative prices. Resources will the n move toward 
the nontraded industry which produces inputs for t he protected 
traded industries (Corden, 1966). Value added per unit would 
then be defined as value added by primary factors plus value 
added by nontraded inputs. 
Multiple Exchange Rates 
The question of multiple exchange rates may also be 
incorporated into the analysis of protective structure 
especially when dealing with developing countries. Different 
exchange rates on imports and exports can be converted into 
nominal tariffs, import subsidies, export taxes and subsidies. 
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Thus , if the official rate is higher than the exchange rate 
applied to imports, this may be regarded as an import subsidy. 
In order to determine the direction in which resources are 
moved between traded g oods, ERPs are calcu l a ted using multiple 
exchange rates. An equilibrium exchange rate that would 
achieve the same BOP result as that which prevails under 
multiple exchange rates must be estimated. The ERPs are then 
restated i n relation to this equilibrium exchange rate. The 
resulting NERPs will determine the effect of the multiple 
exchange rates on the movement of resources between the traded 
and nontraded sector (Carden, 1966). 
Thus in calcula t ing the ERP, we must take into account 
not only protection relative to nont raded goods but also the 
exchange rate effects of a protective structure. A positive 
NERP implies that an industry is protected relative to 
nontraded goods and resources move toward that industry. The 
reverse is true in the case of negative NERP (Corden, 1966). 
The total protection is positive protection with the 
appropriate exchange rate adjustment. The change in value 
added depends on protection relative to both nontraded goods 
and other traded goods. Substitution relative to nontradables 
and to other tradables determines the total protection of an 
industry. 
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Extensions to the ERP Model 
Corden (1966) extends the model of protective structure 
to incorporate the treatment of primary factors, labor and 
capital, as inputs and how to include costs in the measurement 
of the ERP. 
Another extension to the model is the relaxation of some 
or all of the assumptions stated earlier. The ERP c an be 
measured in the case of input-output coefficients not being 
fixed or when substitution exists between primary inputs and 
material inputs . This will tend to overstate the results of 
ERP measurements (Corden, 1966 ). 
Furthermore, the model can be extended to analyze the 
effect of foreign tariffs on the allocation of resources in 
the country under study. Tariffs on tradables of the fore ign 
country have the same effect as an export tax (assuming no 
terms of trade effects} . Foreign input coefficients can also 
be used to calculate the ERP for a country, preferably for 
countries with similar production functions and price ratios 
(Corden, 1966). 
The analysis of the extent of intervention and its effect 
on product prices is extended in some studies by measuring the 
effect of price changes o n productio n and consumption and by 
calculating the reallocation o f income that results from 
intervention. By making such calculations it is p o ssible to 
identify tho se groups who gain and tho se groups who lose from 
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intervention and to measure the extent of gains and losses. 
Objectives of the ERP 
The objective of the ERP theory is "to seek a concept of 
protection that, in the presence of tariff structures 
involving imported intermediate goods, would be able to 
perform analytically the same role that nominal tariffs 
perform in the nominal tariff theory i.e., predict the changes 
in gross output, nominal value of output, primary factor 
allocation, real and/or nominal value added" (Bhagwati and 
Srinivasan, 1983). 
Thus, using the same approach as the nominal rate of 
protection, it is necessary to devise a "price" of value 
added, as an index to rank different activities and to predict 
changes in quantity of value added (Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 
1973) . 
ERPs are useful in policy analysis because they can be 
used to compare the effect of price interventions across 
commodities and to give an indication of the direction of 
resource movements not only within the agricultural sector but 
also between agriculture and other sectors of the economy 
(Bale, 1985) . 
Different trade theorists have used alternative ways to 
define the objective of the ERP. According to Bhagwati and 
Srinivasan (1973) , Corden (1966) is concerned with the 
prediction of gross output, Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1971 ) 
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with predicting gross outputs and pri mary factor allocations 
and Bruno (1973) with real value added, gross outputs and 
primary resources shifts . 
Corden (197 1 ) argues that for the ERP approach to be 
applicable , certain assumptions must be set . If these 
assumptions are violated, and the model loses its simple 
nature, it is no longer possible to obtain neat results. 
Bhagwati a n d Srinivasan (1973) confirm Corden's conclusion. 
In their general equilibrium analysis of the ERP, they 
conclude that, as a drawback of the ERP, the measure o f the 
ERP analogous to the nominal tariff theory does not exist. 
"The ERP index works over a narrower range of sufficient 
conditions that the nominal tariff theory" . Except when the 
Corden-Leith definition is considered where the production 
functions relating output t o primary factors and intermediate 
inputs are separable, the ERP indices are limited in predict-
ing primary factor reallocation and gross output changes. 
Some Empirical Studies of NRP and ERP in Developing Countries 
Studies have confirmed that there is extensive government 
intervention with the market forces in developing countries. 
To determine the extent and the effect of intervention, both 
the NRP and the ERP have been calculated for a selection of 
developing countries. 
One of the earlier studies was carried out by Balassa 
(1971) where the structure of protection for seven countries 
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was estimated. A comparison between the different countries 
was provided with estimates of average NRP and ERP for export 
industries, import-competing industries; each of these 
categories further divided into primary and manufacturing 
activities. They considered interindustry patterns of 
protection based on calculations using actual exchange rates 
and then using exchange rates adjusted for overvalua tion 
compared to the free trade situation. They showed that there 
were some variations of differences in the ranking of 
industries by rates of nominal and effective protection among 
industries but substantial differences in the magnitudes of 
nominal and effective protection for individual industries . 
The protection pattern within the manufacturing sector 
among all the countries showed that effective rates were 
generally lowest on primary commodities and highest on 
consumer goods, with the intermediate goods and machinery 
placed within that range. Most of these countries exported 
primary commodities and the negative protection of these 
primary commodities resulted in the discrimination against 
exports. In some countries, import substitution was favored 
over exporting in manufacturing industries. 
Valdes (1973) examined the effect of trade policy on the 
agricultural trade of Chi le between 1945 and 1965. Chile 
moved from a net exporter of agricultural products prior to 
World War II to a net importer. Valdes' hypothesis was that a 
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the trade gap that existed in Chile was largely due to the 
commercial policies implemented especially in regard to 
exchange rates, price control, export quotas and high prices 
of some inputs originating in highly protected industries. 
Valdes used an extension of the theory of effective protection 
that considers the explicit effects of exchange rates, 
domestic price controls and import duties. The study measured 
the rate of protection for several agricultural activities in 
Chile . 
In this study, the effective rates of protection were 
estimated using a "f ixed proportions" production function in 
which the elasticities of factor substitution were zero. The 
analysis covered fi ve products: wheat, beef, wool, barley and 
lamb . The implicit tariff wa s calculated for each year from 
1947 to 1965 . The values obtained indicated that production 
of wheat, beef, wool and lamb were subject to negative 
effective protection duri ng the entire period. Barley 
production was the only activity without negative protection 
and the one subject to the greatest instability. Thus, Valdes 
concluded that the negative protection of the agricultura l 
sector, due to the type of commercial policies adopted, 
resulted in the trade balance deficit of the agricultural 
goods. 
The World Bank conducted several studies on various 
developing count ries to investigate the effect of government 
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policies on agriculture. Scandizzo and Bruce (1980) 
attempted to research the extent of government intervention in 
developing countries. The method used included, among other 
measures, the NRP, the ERP and the domestic resource cost. 
The six country study confirmed that there was extensive 
interference by governments in developing countries with 
market forces and this had resulted in turning the domestic 
terms of trade against agriculture. It had also led to 
a dverse effects with respect to efficient allocation of 
economic resources and distribution of income. 
Another World Bank study by Bale (1985) studied the 
differences in agricultural performances among five different 
countries and attempted "to identify common policy- induced 
causes of the inhibited development of food systems in 
developing countries". Again NRP and ERP were used to measure 
and evaluate the effects of government intervention . The 
study revealed that there was massive intervention by 
government in production pricing and distribution of food in 
all of the countries studied. This had given rise to internal 
price distortions for domestic products and between domestic 
and international prices of the same product. These 
distortions had serious implications on the economy in terms 
of allocation and efficiency. However, the study showed that 
the government controlled production, distribution and pricing 
of food, not as a source of revenue, but as a result of a 
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distrust in market mechanisms. 
A third study by the World Bank on the effect of 
agricultural pricing policies on the major agricultural crops 
in Egypt, using NRP and ERP measures, revealed the same 
results, i.e., that producers of major crops were taxed 
throughout the period under study (1960 - 1985) by means of 
direct and indirect price interventions. Comparisons between 
the levels of nominal and effective taxation of producers did 
not show any significant difference . The study emphasized the 
importance of exchange rate and trade policies as an instru-
ment of taxation of agricultural producers and subsidization 
of consumers. External policies had negative effects on the 
production of agricultural tradables especially during the 
first decade of the period under study (Dethier , 1988) . 
Jansen (1988) calculated the NRP and ERP for the major 
crops in Zambia for the period 1966 - 1985 . Results showed 
that the net effect of agriculture -specific policies and 
macroeconomic policies provided a disincentive to production 
of the major crops. There was an increase in these negative 
rates over time, and therefore an increase in the disincent-
ives for agricultural producers. The agricultural sector was 
taxed highly during the post - independence period through pri ce 
intervention p olicies on agricultural output and inputs. 
In both the studies in Egypt (Dethier, 1988) and Zambia 
(Jansen, 1988), the value added approach was used due to the 
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unavailability of data on input-output coefficients. 
Krueger, Schiff and Valdes (1988) measured the effects of 
the sectoral and economywide policies of eighteen developing 
countries for the period 1975-1984 using direct, indirect and 
total NRPs. Results showed that the effects of the macro-
economic interventions were larger t han the direct effects , 
whether the latter was positive or negative. Direct policies 
provided protection f or food production in about 70% of the 
countries studied. On average, food imports were subsidized 
while exports were taxed. The indirect policies had negative 
effects and in the case of imported food products, they offset 
t he positive protection provided by the direct policies . With 
indirect interventions , as with direct, exports had been 
taxed. The overvaluation of the exchange rate lowered the 
price of tradables relative to nontradables thus reinforcing 
the taxation of agricultural importables. 
A more recent study of the effects of exchange rate and 
trade policies on agriculture was carried out in Pakistan 
(Dorosh and Valdes, 1990) . The study attempted to quantify 
the "direct effects " of agricultural policy interventions and 
the indirect effects of econo my - wide trade and macroeconomi c 
policies on the agricultural sector. The macroeconomic 
policies in the form of exchange rate and trade policies, had 
a larger impact on the agricultural price incentives. This 
confi rms the findings of Krueger, Schiff and Valdes (1988). 
27 
In some cases, it changed the direction of protection provided 
by the direct agricultural policies. The five major 
agricultural products were taxed consistently during the 20 -
year period under study (1960s to early 1980s). As a result, 
production of these crops suffered. Indirect effects taxed 
producers and subsidized consumers of most food crops and 
cotton . These policies resulted in lower overall agricultural 
growth. 
The Structure of Protection in the Sudan 
El Badawi (1989) investigated the effect of government 
intervention in the agricultural sector in the Sudan using the 
nominal rate of protection (NRP) . El Badawi provided 
calculations for the direct nominal rates of protection (NRPD) 
which measure the effect o f price controls, e xport taxes or 
quotas and other factors directly affecting the price of 
agricultural products. The indirect nominal rate of 
protection (NRPI) was used to measure "the effect of the 
disparities between the off i cial e xchange rate from its 
equilibrium and the intertradable effect of trade policy on 
price" (El Badawi, 1989). El Badawi estimated the extent of 
government intervention through the NRP for six ma jor 
agricultural tradables in the Sudan namely cotton, groundnuts, 
gum arabic , sesame, food grains {a weighted average of sorghum 
and millet) and livestock (a weighted average of sheep and 
cattle) from 1970 to 1986. 
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For the NRP calculations , El Badawi used 
where 
PF1 : domestic producer price of a tradable agricultural 
product (adjusted for transport, storage and other 
marketing costs ) 
P81 : border price P,· evaluated at the official exchange rate 
PNA : nonagricultural sector price index which consists of a 
tradab le share 0 with price PNAT and a nontradable share 
(1 - 0 ) with price PNAH where PNA = OPNAT + (1 -0)PNAH 
P81 . : border price evaluated at the equilibrium nominal 
exc hange rate E. where P81 • = P81 x E. 
PNA·= OPNAT. x E. + (1 - O) PNAH nonagricultural price index 
where the price index of the tradable part is evaluated 
at the equilibrium nominal exchange rate E. and in the 
absence of trade policy affecting nonagricultural 
tradables PNAT. = PNAT I E0 ( 1 + tNAT) 
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tNAT: rate of taxes on nonagricultural tradables 
NRPT: total nominal rate of protection 
El Badawi (1989) uses equilibrium real exchange rates in 
his calculations instead of the nominal exchange rates. Thus 
the formula P81° / PNA. is adjusted t o 
---------
where e · is the real exchange rate and PA. is the foreign price 
of agricultural exports. The real exchange rate is defined as 
Table 2.1: Average NRPD, NRPI and NRPT for major 
agricultural tradables l.n the Sudan (PPP 
Equilibrium ) 
Commodity NRPD NRP I NRPT 
Cotto n -1 8 - 64 -82 
Gr o undnuts - 8 -6 4 -7 2 
Sesame -2 -64 - 66 
Gum Arabic - 15 -6 4 -79 
Food Grain 63 - 64 -1 
Livestock - 15 -6 4 - 79 
Source: El Badawi (1989). 
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Table 2.2: Average NRPD, NRPI and NRPT for major 
agricultural tradables in the Sudan 
(Econometric model RER equilibrium) 
Commodity NRPD NRPI NRPT 
Cotton -39 -11 -50 
Groundnut -18 -11 -29 
Sesame -4 - 11 -15 
Gum Arabi c -41 -11 -52 
Food Grain 207 -11 196 
Livestock -36 -11 -47 
Source: El Badawi (1989). 
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show the results of the calculations 
o f the average NRPD, NRPI and NRPT for the six commodities 
under study. NRPD estimates indicate the direct intervention 
i . e., the percentage by which domestic producer prices differ 
from the prices that would have prevailed under free trade. 
El Badawi revealed that all commodities, with the 
exception of food grains, were taxed through direc t government 
interventions. This subsidization of f ood grains implied that 
the government promoted a food self - sufficiency policy. The 
degree to which all crops were taxed varied; cotton was taxed 
the most. The traditional sector's non-cereal agricultural 
commodities were taxed more than those in the modern sector 
(with the exception of cotton) . 
Trade and macroeconomic policies have also had a negative 
effect on the agricultural sector. These policies, although 
indirect, have had a larger impact o n the sector than the 
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direct policies. The average indirect tax was 64%, about 5.5 
times the average direct tax rate on non -cereal agricultural 
commodities. El Badawi calculated the NRP using both an 
Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate model and a Purchasing Power 
Parity model, obtaining comparable results. 
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CHAPTER 3 . THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR IN THE SUDAN 
The agricultural sector in the Sudan is the most 
important sector in the economy in terms of contribution to 
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP ) , foreign exchange earnings 
and employment. The sector contributes to about 90% of 
foreign exchange export earnings, 40% o f GDP and provides for 
50% of total employment (El Badawi, 1987 ) . Despite its 
substantial contribution to the Sudanese economy, the 
agricultural sector has the potential for expansion in 
production and to contribute further in the economy since less 
than 10% of the cultivatable land (about 207.4 million acres 
and less than 50% of the available water is being utilized at 
the present time (D'Silva and El Badawi, 1987). 
The agricultural sector is divided into irrigated, 
mechanized rainfed and traditional subsectors. A broader 
dichotomy also used is the modern sector (irrigated and 
mechanized) and the traditional sector. The irrigated 
subsector is located in the central no rthern parts of the 
country while the mechanized and traditional rainfed sectors 
are widely dispersed (in the eastern, south - central and 
western regions of the country) . There is a variation in the 
crops produced in each subsector as is clear from Table 3 .1. 
Both the modern and the traditional sectors produce f ood and 
cash crops for local consumption and f o r export (D 'Silva, 
1985) . 
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Table 3.1: The division of the agricultural sector of t he 
Sudan 
Subsector 
Irrigated 
Mechanized 
rainf ed 
Traditional 
Area under 
Production 
over 4 million 
acres 
over 7 million 
acres 
over 9 million 
acres 
Source: D' Silva, 1985. 
Activity 
cotton 
groundnuts 
wheat 
sorghum 
sugarcane 
sorghum 
sesame 
sorghum 
millet 
groundnuts 
sesame 
gum arabic 
other crops 
livestock 
Administration 
g o vernment 
schemes 
(parastatals) 
private and 
public farms 
maj ority of 
population 
(small farms) 
The irrigated subsector is dominated by large government 
schemes. Cotton and groundnuts are the export crops while 
sugarcane and wheat are grown in the irrigated subsector as 
import substitutes. Sorghum (the staple food crop) is grown 
for local consumption (D ' Silva and McKaig , 1986). Livestock 
are only raised in the traditional sector where the majori ty 
of the p opulation live. 
Farmers in the irrigated subsector are restricted in 
their decision-making in terms of land allocation and use o f 
government provided inputs. The producers in the mec hanized 
and traditional rainfed subsectors operate under more 
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competitive environments. The government also undertakes the 
marketing of cotton, sugarcane and whe a t in the irrigated 
subsector while crops are sold commercially in the other two 
subsectors. Prices are determined in the market in both the 
mechanized rainfed subsector and the traditiona l subsector but 
i n the irrigated subsector, the prices are government 
determined (D'Silva, 1985). 
Due to the lack o f the data (especially in the 
traditional sector) , t his study will focus on the irrigated 
subsector in general and the Gezira Scheme in particular. 
The Gezira Irrigatio n Scheme 
The Gezira Irrigation Scheme, a public scheme, is the 
largest and the oldest agricultural irrigation project in the 
Sudan and plays a major role in the Sudanese economy. The 
area under cul tivation in the Gezira Scheme is over 2 million 
feddans, that i s, about 10 per cent of the t o tal area 
c ultivated and about 50 per c ent of the t o tal irrigated area 
in the country. This public scheme is made up o f the Main 
Gezira Scheme (1.1 million feddans) and the Managil Extension 
(1.0 feddans) and each o f these is divided into groups and 
blocks a ccommodating a total o f 1 02 t housand tenancies. The 
si ze of the tenancy ranges from 15 f eddans in Managil which 
has a 3-course rotation to 40 feddans in Gezira Main which 
practices a 4 - course rotation. About 80% of the tenancies l ie 
i n the 15 -20 feddan range (Magar , 1 986) . 
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The strategic importance of the Gezira Scheme stems from 
the fact that a significant portion of the country's 
agricultural production and exports originates in the scheme. 
About 80% of the extra long staple (ELS) cotton and 40% of 
medium staple (MS) cotton (Sudan's main export crop), over 70% 
of wheat and over 30% of groundnuts have been produced in the 
scheme; this has impacted the country's trade and balance of 
payments via export earnings, savings through import 
substitution, and the cost of imported inputs (Magar, 1986) 
The Scheme was initially established as a foreign exchange 
earner through the production of export crops and for self-
sufficiency through the production of food crops. 
The Gezira Scheme was previously run on a tripartite 
partnership (for the production of cotton); the tenants (the 
cultivators or farmers), the Central Government and the Sudan 
Gezira Board (SGB) . Each partner had certain responsibilities 
in the production process and each received a fixed share of 
net profits. The partners shared the expenses related to 
production, preparation and marketing of cotton. Expenses 
were deducted from the total returns on cotton and the net 
distributed between the three partners in the following 
manner: tenants 47%, the Government 36%, the SGB 10%, reserves 
2%, social services 3% and the local government 2% (Basheer, 
1982). The rest of the crops were left up to the tenants and 
they received all the returns from these crops. This was 
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known as the Joint Account System and it continued until June 
1980 when it was replaced by the Individual Account System 
which took effect from the 1981/82 season. 
Under the Joint Account System, the Government was 
responsible f o r the provision of water through the maintenance 
and operation of the dam and canal systems. The Government 
also had control over the financial aspects o f the SGB, 
particularly with respect to the procurement procedures for 
foreign and locally supplied goods and services (Magar, 1986 ) 
The SGB provided a range of services, some of which were 
paid for by the tenants. The Board was responsible for the 
management and administration o f the scheme, for construction, 
maintenance and water distribution in minor canals, for 
certain mechanized farm operat ions, land clearance and 
leveling, allocation of tenancies, instruction and supervision 
of tenants, supply of treated cot t onseed, provision of 
fertilizer, pest control, collection, transportation, ginning, 
baling and storing of cotton lint before sale, extension of 
credit and the provision of loans, and for social development 
within the scheme, such as promotion of social development 
services, financial contribution for applied research (Magar, 
1986) . 
The tenant was responsible f or the management of his 
holding and the cultivation of the crops. Although there was 
some tenant representation on various government bodies, the 
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tenants had limited influence in most decision concerning 
production such as decisions on rotation of crops, irrigation, 
pricing policies and post harvest operations, especially with 
respect to cotton. I n addition, the tenant had no power to 
take any kind of action in cases where the government and the 
SGB fails to carry out their obligations. Thus, this was not 
an equal partnership as far as the tenants were concerned 
(Magar, 1986 ) . 
The Joint Account System provided no incentive for the 
tenants to produce efficiently as the fixed percentage sharing 
of costs resulted in the efficient producer bearing a larger 
share of the expenses than the inefficient producer . Tenants 
therefore put more effort in the production of the other crops 
using input resources specified for cotton. Both the tenants 
and the SGB also tried to transfer much of their individual 
expenses to the Joint Account. This increase in the joint 
e xpenses,in addition to the increase in the price of imported 
inputs, resulted in the decline in net revenue for the three 
partners. The debt of the tenants was also increasing 
steadily under the Joint Account System due to the late 
payment for the purchase of cotton (Ibrahim, 1989 ) . 
The Individual Account 
In the late 1970's, the Gezira Scheme witnessed a decline 
in the productivity of all the crops in general and in cotton 
in particular and a dramatic increase in expenses. This 
38 
resulted in the migration of many farmers and the abandonment 
of their land to find other sources of income. There was also 
a noticeable change in the structure of farmers in the scheme 
because of the movement of the younger generations to 
nonagricultural activities {Basheer , 1982). It was believed 
that the production relations played a major role in this 
situation as the Joint Account System (for cotton) prevailing 
at that time did not give the farmer incentive to produce. 
The Joint Account System was abandoned for cotton and replaced 
in 1980, by the Individual Account System and land and water 
charges for each crop. 
The responsibilities of the three partners did not c hange 
under the new system . However, the tenant now bears all the 
expenses of the production of cotton and receives all the 
revenue after deducting individual expenses and the cost of 
inputs and agricultural loans given to the tenant. In 
addition, the tena nt pays land and water charges (to the 
Government and the SGB) (See Appendix A, Table A. 5) instead of 
t he percentage that the Government obtained from the net 
revenue from sale of cotton under the Joint Account System. 
The land and water charges are not only imposed on cotton but 
on all other crops grown by the tenant. These charges are 
flat rates paid annually regardless of production and are 
determined according to the costs of irrigation and management 
and the amount o f utilization (Basheer, 1982). 
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The Individual Account System allowed the tenant to treat 
all crops equally and flexibility and freedom in making 
production decisions and use of inputs which gave the tenant 
the incentive to inc rease productivity and to enjoy higher 
unshared returns. The tenant is also paid for his c r op in one 
installment as opposed to three installments under the Joint 
Account System. However, the tenant also bears the risk 
alone. Furthermore, it is argued that a flat rate for land 
and water charges is not equitable considering the differences 
in soil and climatic conditions in various parts of the Gezira 
as well as the fact that the returns from crops differed 
(Ibrahim, 1989) . 
The Individual Account System has proven to be more 
successful than the Joint Account System . It has led to an 
increase in productivity, higher efficiency and quality and 
increased returns for all three parties (the tenant, SGB and 
t he government ) . 
The four main crops that are grown in the Gezira Scheme 
are cotton, wheat, groundnuts and sorghum, although vegetables 
are also grown. Appendix A shows production details for the 
crops grown in the Gezira Scheme . All crops are irrigated 
with wheat being almost fully mechanized and cotton, 
groundnuts and s o rghum partially mechanized. The SGB is 
involved in the mechanization process, mainly in the 
production of cotton . The mechanization of other crops is 
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taken up by private enterprises (Magar, 1986). 
Credit Institutions 
Fo rmal Credit 
The SGB provides credit to the tenants to finance major 
production operations such as planting, weeding and harvesting 
of cotton (D'Silva , 1986). For whea t, the Bank of Sudan 
provides loans that are administered by the SGB. Before the 
Individual Account System, expenses incurred in the production 
o f these crops , were deducted from the proceeds of cotton 
sales. These included land preparation, ridging, purchasing 
of seeds and fertilizers, transportation and sto rage, sacks, 
marketing and cash advances for the payment of agricultural 
laborers. 
The cash advances given to the tenant are usually well 
below the recommended rates and thus the tenant has to look 
for other means of financing to supplement the cash advances. 
Furthermore, these advances are not given to all tenants, nor 
are they uniform in amount. Because they do not cover the 
actual costs of cultivation, tenants have used these funds for 
daily household expenses. In recent years, many tenants have 
been unable to repay the loans and the government's decision 
to defer payment has resulted in an accumulation of debt 
(Magar, 1986). 
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Informal Credit 
The tenant has to rely on his own financial resources for 
the cultivation of crops besides cotton and wheat . Tenants 
who do not possess private capital find themselves compelled 
to use the "sheil" system (mortgage of crops ) which involves 
high real rates of interest (ranging from 60% to 200% ) . There 
are several forms of "sheil". The tenant may borrow money and 
then repay the lender in the form of grain at harvest time or 
the lender may market the crop for a mark-up. The tenant may 
also enter into a contract where he promises to deliver a 
ce r tain amount of the crop to the lender. In this case, if 
the price of the crop is high, the merchant keeps the surplus 
and if it is low, he suffers the loss (Ali, 1986a). 
It is estimated the 60-90% of tenants practice ''sheil" 
system for sorghum, 45% for wheat and 40% for groundnuts 
(Magar, 1986). The debts in the informal system seem to be 
increasing due to the low yields in production and the rising 
cost of factors of production. The extremely high interest 
rates have forced tenants even farther into debt. Some 
tenants have resorted to subleasing all or parts of their land 
as a way to finance the increasing costs o f production 
especially with crops of a high labor component such as 
groundnuts and vegetables. The "sheil" system acts as a 
disincentive to producers as the crop is not enough to cover 
the amount o f the loans. 
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Another method used to finance production expenses 
(particularly labor and weeding) is sharecropping , practiced 
mainly in the case of groundnuts cultivation. About 60% of 
tenants are involved in sharecropping. After the land is 
prepared by the tenant, the sharecropper takes over the rest 
of the farming process from sowing to harvesting (Ali, 1986a) 
The yield is then divided equally among the tenant and the 
sharecropper. This system is considered to be better than the 
"sheil " system in terms of the tenant ' s ability to have some 
kind of control over his crop and income . However , both 
systems result in a substantial reduction in the tenant's 
income and force him farther into debt. Furthermore, the 
tenant is not encouraged to improve his crop and yields as the 
sharing of the proceeds acts as a disincentive (Magar, 1986). 
Pricing and Marketing 
The Cotton Public Corporation (CPC) is in charge of 
marketing cotton for export and selling the lint to local 
textile mills. The CPC, on behalf of the Government , buys all 
the cotton produced in the Sudan at the gingate at fixed 
prices. Prices are based on f .o .b. Port Sudan prices minus 
costs (ginning, transportation, etc.). The grading of 
seedcotton, ginning , baling and the transportation of lint to 
Port Sudan is the responsibility of the SGB and the prices 
paid by the CPC include allowances for the costs incurred by 
the SGB for the ginning and transportation of cotton lint 
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(Babiker, 1986). Procurement prices (based on variety and 
grade) are declared at the beginning of the agricultural 
season for seedcotton and the tenant is paid according to 
these prices after deducting cost of ginning , transportation 
and insurance . If prices of cotton are higher than the 
declared prices, the increase goes to the tenant l ater on 
(Magar , 1986). 
The tenant is responsible for the delivery of the seed 
cotton to the collecting centers o f the block. Ot her crops 
are sold and collected at the farmgate or taken to the local 
markets and bartered or sold for cash . 
The other crops produced in the Gezira Scheme are the 
responsibility of the tenant. There are t wo marketing 
channels (official and unofficial) for wheat. Through the 
official channel, wheat is delivered to government authorized 
mills by the SGB at fixed prices. The Government subsidizes 
the consumer if the official farmgate prices are higher by 
paying the difference through the SGB. However , there also 
exits a free "unofficial" market for wheat where prices are 
20-30% higher than the official farmgate price (Babiker, 
1986) . Although a large portion of the wheat crop ends up in 
this market, it does not necessarily benefit the tenant 
because of the 11 sheil" system (Magar , 1986) . The loans for 
wheat cultivatio n provided to tenants by SGB are deducted from 
the proceeds of the wheat delivered to the mills and thus, 
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tenants are able to avoid repayment of the loans on the 
portion of the wheat that is sold in the "unofficial" market 
(Babiker, 1986). 
Before 1980, the export of groundnuts, sesame seeds and 
cast or beans was monopolized by the Sudan Oilseed Company 
which also determined f .o.b . export prices and set annual 
floor prices for domestic trade. After the abolishment of the 
Sudan Oilseed Company in 1980, a free export market was 
established and private merchants were able to sell on the 
world market. The Sudan Company of Processing of Oilseeds, 
was established "to compete with private oil mills in the 
supply of vegetable oils to both local and export markets" 
(Magar, 1986). The government declares floor prices for 
groundnuts as a guideline for traders in groundnuts (Babiker, 
1986). 
Sorghum in the Gezira Scheme is considered to be a 
subsistence crop, used for household consumption. Any surplus 
is sold in the local markets (Magar, 1986). Some of t he 
surplus may also be used as payment-in-kind to the laborers 
hired during the cotton picking season (Babiker, 1986). 
Inputs 
Among the major inputs imported for the agricultural 
sector is fuel, 48% of which is used by the irrigated 
subsector. Gasoline is used for wa terpumps, electricity, 
agricultural machinery and transportation (Ali, 1986b). 
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Fertilizers, pesticides, insecticides, seeds, jute sacks and 
machinery are also imported to be used as inputs in the 
production of crops (D 1 Silva, 1986). Fertilizers and 
machinery are provided at subsidized rates to the modern 
sector which relies heavily on imported inputs. As f oreign 
exchange is scarce, the two subsectors , the irrigated and the 
mechanized rainfed, have to compete for these inputs. The 
traditional sector has negligible use of imported input s . 
As menti oned earlier, most of the decisions concerning 
agricultural operations are made by the SGB, particularly with 
respect to cropping patterns and agronomic practices. The SGB 
also carries out operations such as ploughing, pest and 
disease control, the choice of fertilizer and its mechani cal 
applications for the tenant at his expense. Mechanization is 
confined to land preparation, carried out by SGB for cotton 
and by the private sector for the other crops . In recent 
years, both the mechanization process and the spraying for 
pest control have been done inefficiently, thus contributing 
to lower yields (Magar, 1986 ) . 
Inputs for cotton production are normally provided by the 
SGB but inputs f or other crops are bought by the tenants from 
the local markets. Use of fertilizer is restricted to cot ton 
and wheat while use o f insecticide is restricted t o cotton 
only (D 1 Silva, 1986). Treated and tested seeds of extra long 
Staple cotton and medium staple cotton are distributed to 
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tenants by SGB. Water is provided to the tenants by SGB at 
subsidized rates (Ali, 1986b). 
Sudan has a poor transportation system in general but the 
Gezira scheme enjoys relatively better transport providing 
access to markets. Commercial trucks are used for the 
transportation of crops to collection centers, mills, etc. 
Tenants use animal carts for hauling goods shorter distances. 
The Sudan Railways is used to transport crops and other 
agricultural commodities to Port Sudan for export (Babiker, 
1986) . 
The Labor Market 
Sudanese agricultural labor is c haracteri zed by high 
mobili ty both to and from the irrigated areas in the North and 
the mechanized rainfed areas in the East. Migrant workers are 
mainly from the West of Sudan where lack o f water during the 
dry season (December to June) force labor to look for work in 
other regions. The peak demand f or labor in the irrigated 
regions (particularly for cotton cultivation) is from January 
to March and for the mechanized rainf ed areas during the 
months of November and December (Fallon, 1988). 
The Gezira Scheme employs a large portion of the seasonal 
migrant labor. In addition to the tenants and their families, 
there are workers from the local villages, migrants from 
Northern Nigeria and Chad living in settlements around the 
area and seasonal migration workers from outside the area 
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(mainly from Western Sudan and the Southern Provinces, with 
some peasants from traditional agriculture in the central and 
eastern areas as well as some nomadic groups). 
Tenants rely heavily upon imported labor for weeding and 
harvesting of most crops especially cotton (D'Silva, 1986 ) . 
Migrant labor supply a significant amount of the work done in 
the Gezira Scheme (about 50% of the total labor force in 
1984) . Migrants are recruited by both a Central Committee and 
by representatives of groups of individual workers, in 
addition to migrant labor who show up at the Scheme during the 
peak season (floating labor) . Transportation to the Gezira 
Scheme is paid by the recruiter (ILO/UNHCR, 1986). 
Migrant labor may start work in the mechanized rainf ed 
farms at the end of the year and then move on to the irrigated 
areas at the beginning of the next year. There are some 
laborers , however, who migrate from the West to the East only 
to the irrigated regions and who have the same employer for 
years while there are others who work in the Central Pro vinces 
during the middle of the year continuing in this manner for 
years before returning home (Fallon, 1988). Some of the 
migrant laborers from Western Sudan and Western Africa have 
settled in camps near the Scheme and these represent a large 
portio n of the seasonal labor (Mohamed, 1986). 
Table A.4 in Appendix A gives the picking labor 
statistics for the Gezira Scheme f or the perio d 1978/79 to 
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1987/ 88 divided into family labor, imported labor and floating 
labor. As is apparent from the table, the total number of 
available labor is less than the total number of labor 
required for most years in the Gezira Scheme. This indicates 
a shortage of labor available, especially during the peak 
seasons . Poor rainfal l and low yields in recent years have 
resulted in the shift of agricultura l labor to other sectors 
o f the economy. 
The demand for labor depends on certain factors, 
including the number o f members in the tenant household 
willing to work, the financial ability o f the tenant and the 
seasonality of agricultural operations. These three factors 
also determine the labor contract, i.e., the terms on which 
l abor is demanded (ILO/ UNHCR, 1986 ) . 
The relationship between the tenant and the laborer is 
not a purely market relatio nship since factors of kinship, 
friendship and patronage also enter into the transaction. 
This affects the amount and form of payment f o r t he l abor 
provided. Laborers in the Scheme are paid both in cash and in 
kind, usually in the f o rm of sorghum. The wage rate structure 
is also affected by what is happening in the other 
agricultural regions . For example, in 1985, a bumper sorghum 
crop in the mechanized rainfed region resulted in higher wages 
in that region and thus a shortage of l abo r for cotton picking 
in the irrigated subsector (D' Silva, 1986 ) . The government 
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does not intervene in the mechanism of the private sector 
labor markets . In 1974 , a minimum wage law was imposed but it 
applied only to permanent workers in t he o rganized sector . 
There are certain periods during the year (su ch as the 
growth , weeding and harvesting periods ) when the tenant 
requires more labor but suffers problems o f l iquidity and c ash 
flows . In order t o finance cultivation, poor tenants get 
money by borrowing at high interest rates or by forward 
sel ling. Some tenants are forced to supplement their farm 
incomes by working as laborers on the farms of wealthier 
tenants. 
Government Policies 
Agriculture was given priority in t he major economic 
development plans in the Sudan which included the Five Year 
Plan (1970-1975), extended to 1976/77, the Six Year Plan 
(1977-1983) and the World Bank Rolling I nvestment Programs 
(Abdel Salam, 1986). However , despite the contribution of the 
tradit ional sector to foreign exchange earn ings and food 
supplies (50% and 60% in 1984/85 respectively) and the fact 
that the majority of the p opulation live in this sector , it 
has been neglected in terms of investment al l ocation s , 
infrastructure and services. During the Six Year Plan, 80% of 
the total funds (425 million Sudanese pounds) a l located to the 
agricultural sector was directed toward the modern sector and 
only 3% to t he traditional sector (D ' Silva and El Badawi, 
50 
1987) . 
The irrigated and mechanized subsectors have received 
about 70% of investment . Public sector investments have been 
primarily in the irrigated subsector. In the mechanized 
rainfed subsector, investment has been mainly through private 
capital especially from the Middle East countries such as 
Saudi Arabia (El Badawi, 1989). Private capital investment in 
the agricultural sector has been encouraged by the government 
(D'Silva, 1985 ) . 
Government Policy Instruments 
Sector-Specific Policies 
Taxes 
Agri culture has been viewed as a major source of tax 
revenue and therefore the agricultural sector has been subject 
to a number of taxes, both implicit and explicit, on 
agricultural commodities (D'Silva and El Badawi, 1987) The 
government extracts about 80 % of its revenue from taxes. 
Export crops are directly taxed via export duties (ad valorem 
t axes) . The development tax (which i s basically a 
manufacturer's sales tax) is an indirect tax imposed on 
exported commodities. Custom duties (both ad valorem and 
specific), consumption duties and a defense tax are imposed on 
imports. There are also other taxes imposed in the form of 
excise taxes and local taxes (Youngblood et al , 1982). 
Cotton, one of the most important cash crops, has been 
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taxed the most. Implicit export taxes underpriced cotton seed 
and lint sold to local textile industries and explicit taxes 
included export duty imposed on f .o.b. prices of cotton. In 
1971, a price stabilization levy on all cotton exports was 
implemented. In addition to these taxes, deductions were made 
as payment for services rendered such as commission for 
marketing and preparation charges (Abdel Salam, 1986). 
Custom duties were also imposed on inputs such as spare 
parts and fuel although insecticides and agricultural 
machinery were exempted. A defense tax, originally a 
development tax, was levied on all imports with the exception 
of a few commodities (Abdel Salam, 1986) . 
Subsidies 
The irrigated and mechanized subsectors receive subsidies 
from the government; the irrigated subsector being subsidized 
the most. As mentioned earlier, the traditional sector is not 
subsidized. Subsidies in the mechanized rainfed subsector 
include subsidized imported inputs through the overvalued 
exchange rate, low land rent , low fuel prices and cheap credit 
(with high rates of default) (Abdel Salam, 1986). The 
government also subsidizes some consumer commodities such as 
wheat bread , sugar and petroleum products. These items 
constituted about 60% of the import bill between 1975 and 1980 
(D'Silva , 1985). However, the government has made attempts to 
reduce these subsidies (El Badawi, 1989). 
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Price Regulations 
Price control is an important instrument in the 
agricultural policy of the Sudan. Government control involves 
complete regulation of some commodities through public 
monopolies which fix producer prices such as the Cotton Public 
Corporation, the Gum Arabic Company and until 1981, the Oil 
Seed Company. Floor prices are announced by the government 
for cotton, gum arabic, groundnuts, sesame and sorghum at the 
start of every season . In the traditional rainfed subsecto r, 
auction market prices prevail for sorghum and millet . In the 
remote traditional regions, there is a mo nopsony on 
agricultural products and thus traders are able to dictate the 
price. Wheat prices in the irrigated subsector are determined 
on the basis of import parity but the government determines 
the prices of wheat and wheat bread (Abde l Salam, 1986 ) . 
Other Agricultural Policies 
The irrigated subsector experiences the most in terms of 
government interventions . In addition to setting producer and 
input prices , the government also controls land allocation and 
imposes fixed cropping patterns (El Badawi, 1989). It 
provides specific services to the subsector in the form of 
irrigation water, land preparation and fertilizer. As 
mentioned before, the irrigated subsector also had a joint 
account where cotton proceeds , net of costs , were distributed 
among the three partners - the government, the tenants and the 
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SGB. This was changed in 1981/1982 and replaced by individual 
accounts which provided producers with more incentives 
(D'Silva, 1985). Fertilizers are also restricted by the 
government to use on cotton and wheat. 
Macroeconomic Policies 
Sudan's Foreign Trade Policies 
The Sudanese government has exercised an extensive system 
of import restrictions and fixed multiple exchange rates. 
These control and regulatory measures include high import 
tariffs, import and export quotas (tight licensing) and 
banning of certain imports. Table 3.2 gives a detailed 
summary of government policies concerning exchange rates and 
trade from 1970 t o 1987 (adapted from Hassan, 1989) . 
Exchange rate policies have had a major effect on 
producer incentives in the agricultural sector. The 
government aimed, as in many countries, at industrial 
substitution. After the expansionary policies of the mid 
1970's, financed by deficit financing and external borrowing, 
the Sudan's economic difficulties increased. The government 
tried to direct the foreign and payment regime toward 
increasing government revenues, improving the balance of 
payment deficit, encouraging remittances from Sudanese 
nationals working in other countries and export promotion 
(El Badawi, 1987). 
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Table 3 .2: Exchange rate and foreign trade policies in Sudan 
Year 
1970/71 
1972 
July 1973 
Jan. 1974 
May 1975 
June 1978 
Mar. 1979 
July 1979 
Sept 1979 
Sept 1980 
June 1981 
July 1981 
Nov. 1981 
1982 
Feb. 1983 
Mar . 1983 
May 1983 
Oct. 1984 
Feb. 1985 
1986 
1987 
Trade and Payment Regimes 
Strict import against payment system. All foreign exchange 
proceeds from exports are to be surrendered to the Bank of 
Sudan. All transactions at the official rate (OR). 
Exchange tax/subsidy (ETS) introduced to all exports except 
cotton and gum arabic . 
Premium rate for remittances of Sudanese Nationals working 
abroad (RR ) . 
RR adjusted , nil value system for imports introduced. 
Gum arabic exports moved to ETS rate (ER1). 
1st devaluation, ER 1 adjusted. 
RR adjusted. 
ETS extended to cotton (CN-INP). 
2nd devaluation, more liberalized trade (nil-value system 
abolished), unification of exchange rates (all ETS and RR 
removed), a parallel rate of LS 0.80 for selected exports and 
imports. 
All exports and imports except CN-INP and GVIMP at parallel 
rate. 
CN-INP moved to parallel market rate (PR). 
Exc hange dealers (ED) licensed and black market legalized. 
3rd devaluation (OR and PR unified), all trade except l / 4th of 
non-cotton (NC) exports at PR, the rest at free market rate. 
4 th devaluation. 
Commercial banks (CB) licensed to deal at FR, 25\ of exports at 
free market rate (FR ) . 
Licenses for ED and CB revoked , then reinstated for CB in May 
and for ED in June 1983. 
Exports of NG -NC at FR and 50% of export revenues (100% for 
sesame) to be transferred to Central Bank . 
5th devaluation, stringent import licensing and currency control 
(39 i mport items banned, licenses of ED revoked ) , RR to be 
operated b y CB (crawling rate) . 
CB committee to allocate foreign exchange by priority list. 
Imports ban list extended to more than 100 items. 
6th devaluation, more liberal import system (similar to the nil-
value) . 
OR: official exchange rate; ER1 : exchange tax / subsidy adjusted rate (ETSAR) 
for non -government imports and non-cotton exports(NG-NC); ER2 : ETSAR for 
government imports (GVTIMP), whic h consists of petroleum, wheat , and sugar 
mainly; ER3 : the cotton exports and imported inputs rate (CN-INP) and RR: 
the premium rate for Sudanese nationals working abroad (SNWA) remittances. 
Exchange rates are measured as units of local currency per us 
dollar (LS / US$) . 
Source: Hassan, 1989. 
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Sudan's foreign trade policy can be thought o f in terms 
of three periods - the preliberal i zat ion period (befo re 1978 ) , 
the liberalization period (1978-1984 ) and the post 
liberalization period (1984-1987) (Hassan, 1989). The first 
period invo lved full exc hange control under fixed exchange 
rates. A strict import system was maintained and multiple 
exchange rates were used to promote exports, encourage private 
transfers and provide protection to domestic industries. 
After the economic situation worsened in 1979, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF ) encouraged the Sudan to 
embark o n a trade liberalization po licy and to remove all 
exchange controls. During this period, all import systems 
were abolished and the Sudanese pound was devalued four times. 
Two exchange rates, the official rate and the paral lel rate, 
were established . In 198 0 , all non-cotton exports (and later 
cotton ) and non - government imports were eval uated at the 
parallel rate. The black market for foreign exchange was 
legalized and exports and imports were gradually moved t o the 
free market rate . These policies were implemented with the 
objective of aligning domestic pric es with border prices, 
providing incentives for producers of exportables, reducing 
demand f o r imports and unifying the exc hange rates (El Badawi, 
1989 ) . 
These liberalization policies failed dramatically due to 
other economic distortions and the government returned to the 
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previous policy of imposing controls and restrictions on 
imports and exchange rates. Certain import items were banned 
in 1985 and the export of sorghum, which was already subject 
to import quotas, was banned during the drought period of 
1985-1986 . Higher import tariffs were imposed and imports 
declined in 1985 and 1986 . Only what the government 
considered priority commodities were imported (USAID , 1985) 
In early 1987, Sudan devalued the exchange rate for some 
export crops by nearly 35% but left other exchange rates 
unchanged. The exchange rate was devalued to improve the 
competitiveness of the Sudan's agricultural export and to 
increase the cost of imported goods. 
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CHAPTER 4. MEASUREMENT OF PROTECTION 
The Nominal Rate of Protection (NRP) and the Effective 
Rate of Protection (ERP) are used to measure the effects of 
government intervention, both sector-specific and economywide, 
on the three major crops grown in the Gezira Scheme, namely 
cotton and groundnuts (export commodities) and wheat 
(importable). The protection rates are based on data on the 
farmgate prices of these agricultural products, border price 
equivalents (adjusted at the farmgate ) evaluated at the 
official exchange rate and at the equilibrium nominal exchange 
rate and the nonagricultural price index. Value added for 
these crops is also required in the calculation of the ERP . 
The estimation of value added uses cost of production data 
which includes prices and costs of tradable inputs measured at 
domestic prices, at border prices evaluated at the official 
exchange rate and at border prices evaluated at the 
equilibrium nominal exchange rate . The period under study is 
1980 to 1988. 
The methods used for calculation of NRP and ERP and the 
estimation of the border prices, the nonagricultural price 
index, the equilibrium nominal exchange rate and the value 
added for these agricultural products closely follow the 
procedure used by Dethier (1988) . 
The units of measurement for some of the time series data 
used in this study differs from what has been used in the 
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Dethier study, especially data obtained from the Gezira 
Current Statistical Bulletin (1989) and the Bank of Sudan 
Annual Reports. The measurement units of some of the data 
has, therefore, been converted to fit the study and the 
methods of conversion will be explained in detail in the 
relevant sections. Table 4.1 presents the measures and the 
equivalents used. 
Table 4.1: Measures and equivalents 
Item 
One Feddan 
One Kilogram 
One Metric Ton 
One Kantar 
(Seedcotton) 
One Kantar 
(Lint Cotton) 
One Bale 
(Seedcotton) 
Type of Measure 
Area of Land 
Weight 
Weight 
Weight 
Weight 
Weight 
Equivalent 
4200 square meters 
1.0379 acres 
0.42 hectares 
2.2258 pounds 
1000 kilograms 
2204.5 pounds 
315 pounds 
143 kilograms 
110 pounds 
50 kilograms 
420 pounds 
191 kilogram 
Sources: Gezira Statistical Bulletin 1978/79-1987/88, SGB, 
1989. 
Moe and Haddad, Export Development Study-Sudan, World 
Bank, 1983 . 
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Data and Calculations 
Farmgate Prices 
Farmgate prices of cotton, groundnuts and wheat are 
obtained from the Gezira Current Statistics for 1978/79-
1987 / 88 (Sudan Gezira Board, 1989 ) and represent prices 
received by farmers for the unpr ocessed (raw ) cotton. The 
f armgate price of groundnuts and wheat are expressed in 
Sudanese pounds (LS) per ton and are taken directly from the 
Gezira Current Statistics bulletin (Sudan Gezira Board, 1989 ) . 
Table 4.2 presents the farmgate prices received f o r 
groundnuts and wheat by farmers in the Gezira Scheme for the 
pe r iod 1979 / 80 to 1 987/88. 
Table 4 . 2: Farmgate prices for groundnuts and wheat (LS / ton ) 
Year 
1979 / 80 
1980 / 81 
1981/ 82 
1982 / 83 
1983 / 84 
1984 / 85 
1985/ 86 
1986 / 87 
1987/ 88 
Farmgate Prices o f 
Groundnuts (LS / t on) 
78 . 0 
262.0 
180.0 
330.0 
420.0 
588.0 
1120 . 0 
1232.0 
1400.0 
Farmgate Prices of 
Wheat (LS/ ton) 
118.5 
160 . 0 
230.0 
280.0 
360.0 
700. 0 1 
700.0 
770.0 
1001.0 
1 No wheat production in the Gezira Scheme in 1984 / 85 . 
Farmgate price f o r wheat f o r 1984 / 85 was obtained from 
Abdelrahman, 1990. 
Source: Sudan Gezira Board (1989 ) . 
Note: The fisc al year 1979/80 is taken t o be calendar year 
1980, 1980 / 81 to be 1981 and s o on. 
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Farmgate prices of cotton are for seedcotton {unginned , 
raw cotton) . Price data for cotton is given by grade and by 
variety. The two varieties grown in the Gezira Scheme are 
extra long staple cotton (ELS) and medium staple cotton (MS) 
and a different price is quoted for each variety every year. 
Prices also vary according to grade. The Gezira extra long 
staple variety has 9 grades and the medium staple variety has 
5 o r 6 grades {varies for some years) . The price of the fifth 
grade has been used as an "average" price for ELS cotton and 
the price of the third grade has been used as an "average" 
price in the case of MS cotton. These prices are roughly the 
unweighted averages of all the grades for each variety. 
Table 4.3 shows cotton prices according to grade and 
variety for the period 1980/81 to 1987/88. No price is quoted 
for 1979/80 by the Gezira Scheme; the 1980 farmgate price for 
cotton that will be used in the calculations below is taken 
from El Badawi (1989 ). 
As is apparent from Table 4.3, prices for cotton are 
expressed in LS/kantar and these have been converted to LS/ton 
by dividing by 0 .14 3 (1 kantar= 0 . 143 metric tons). 
A weighted average price is then calculated for cotton 
using ELS and MS cotton prices; the weights being the share of 
each variety on total cotton production for each year. Thus, 
the weighted average price is the weighted sum of prices for 
the two varieties of cotton. 
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Table 4.3: Farmgate prices fo r cotton (LS/kantar ) 
Season 80/81 81/82 82/83 83 /8 4 84785 85/86 86787 87/88 
Grade (ELS Cotton) 
1 78.5 102 104 12 7 15 5 235 273 338 
2 76.5 98 100 122 150 230 268 328 
3 74.5 94 96 117 14 5 225 263 318 
4 72.5 90 92 112 140 220 258 308 
5 70.5 86 88 107 135 215 248 293 
6 67.5 81 83 102 130 210 238 278 
7 64.5 76 78 97 125 205 228 263 
8 61.5 71 73 92 12 0 200 218 248 
9 58.5 66 68 87 115 193 208 233 
----- ----------- ------------------- ----------- --- ---------- --
Grade (MS Cotton ) 
1 54 . 5 70 72 90 114 210 228 263 
2 52 . 5 68 70 86 110 205 223 253 
3 50 . 5 66 68 82 106 200 218 243 
4 48.5 64 66 79 102 195 213 233 
5 62 64 74 98 190 203 219 
6 185 193 203 
Source : Sudan Gezira Board (1989). 
Tabl e 4.4 s ho ws the share of ELS and MS cotton in the 
production of cotton in the Gezira Scheme for the period under 
study. 
Tabl e 4. 5 shows the weigh ted average farmgate price of 
seedcotton expressed in LS/ton . First the average (grade ) 
price of ELS and MS cotton, expressed in LS/ kantar, is 
converted to LS/ton and then a weighted average (variety ) 
price is calcul ated in LS/ton using the weights from Table 
4. 4. 
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Table 4.4: Percentage share of ELS and MS cotton in total 
product ion (1979/80- 1987 /88) 
Year Production Total Percentage Share 
in Kantar Production Total Pro duction 
in Kantar 
ELS MS ELS MS 
1979 / 80 446,588. 0 94, 302.0 5 4 0 , 890.0 82.6% 17 . 4% 
1980 / 81 42 6 ,925. 0 74,277.0 501,202.0 85 . 2% 14.8% 
1981/ 82 379,889.0 55, 42 5.0 435,314.0 87.3% 12.7% 
1982 /83 375,359 . 5 108,955.5 484,315.0 77.5% 22.5% 
1 983/84 3 4 6,609 . 0 151,120. 0 497,729.0 69 . 6% 30.4% 
1984 /85 345,297.5 119,494.5 4 64 , 792.0 74.3% 25.7% 
1985/86 376,139.3 24,419.0 4 00 ,558.3 93 . 9% 6 .1% 
1986/87 328 ,435. 0 86,639 . 0 41 5 , 074 . 0 79 .1% 20 . 9% 
1987/ 88 237,992 . 0 145,045. 0 383 , 037.0 62.1% 37.9% 
Percentage Share o f variety in total production = Production 
o f varie ty divided by the total productio n. 
Source : Sudan Gezira Board (1989). 
Table 4. 5: Weighted average farrngate prices of seedcotton 
in 
Year Farrngate Price Farrngate Price Price of Seed Cotton 
of Cot t o n of Cotton Weig hted Average 
(LS/Kantar ) (LS / Ton ) (LS/Ton) 
ELS MS ELS MS 
1979 /80 N/ A1 N/ A1 44 1 . 650 1 
1980 /81 70 . 5 5 0 . 5 492.318 352 .654 4 71 . 648 
1981 /82 86.0 66 . 0 600.559 4 60 . 894 582 . 822 
1982 / 83 88.0 68.0 614.525 474.860 583 . 1 00 
1983/84 107.0 82.0 747 . 207 572 . 626 694.134 
1984 /85 1 35 .0 106.0 942.737 740.223 890 . 691 
1985 /86 215 . 0 200.0 1 501.397 1396 . 648 1495 . 007 
1986/87 248 . 0 218.0 1731.844 1522.346 1688 . 059 
198 7 /88 293 . 0 2 4 3 . 0 2046 .089 1696.927 1913 . 757 
1 N/ A: not available. Figure obtained fro m El Badawi 1989 . 
- Farrngate price (LS/ To n ) = farrngate price (LS/ Kantar ) / 0 .143 . 
- Weighted average price = % share in total production of ELS x 
farrngate price of ELS (LS/ Ton ) + % share in tota l production 
of MS x farrngate price of MS (LS/Ton) . 
Source : Sudan Gezira Board, 1989. 
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It is important to note that the farmgate prices of 
cotton, groundnuts and wheat in the Gezira Scheme do not 
reflect the prices of these crops across the country. Prices 
vary across regions and across the three sectors of 
agriculture, viz, the irrigated, mechanized and traditional 
sectors. However, the Gezira Scheme is the major producer of 
cotton in the Sudan (80% of ELS and 40% of MS cotton ) as well 
as producing significant amounts of wheat (70%) and groundnuts 
(30%) . 
Border Price Equivalents 
Border price equivalents are estimates of prices that 
prevail in the absence of government pricing policy. The 
world prices of the abovementioned commodities expressed in 
domestic currency are adjusted at the farmgate by taking into 
account transportation, handling, processing and other costs 
so as to "bring them to a comparable basis wi th domestic 
prices" (Dethier, 1988 ). In calculating border prices, the 
basic assumption is that technological coefficients are 
constant and are not affected by changes in the relative price 
of traded to nontraded inputs (Dethier, 1988 ) . 
Border prices o f cotton, groundnuts and whea t adjusted at 
the farmgate are calculated. Border prices of cottonseed and 
fertilizer are required in the calculation of the border price 
o f cotton and the estimation of value added at border prices 
also requires the border price equivalent of fer til izer. 
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Border prices are evaluated at the official exchange rate 
(E0 ) and at the equilibrium nominal exchange rate (E. ) . There 
are different exchange rates f o r different agricultural 
tradables and the border price for each crop is evaluated at 
the respective exchange rate. 
Table 4 . 6 presents the exchange rates that app l y t o 
cotton, groundnuts and wheat respectively. The method by 
which the equilibrium exchange rate (E. ) is derived is 
presented in a later section. Exchange rates f o r c o tton and 
groundnuts have been obtained from El Badawi (1989 ) . For 
wheat, the official exchange rate used is also from El Badawi 
(1989) . 
Table 4.6: Exchange rates for c o tton, groundnuts and wheat 
(LS / US$ ) 
Year 
1979 / 80 
1980 / 81 
1981 / 82 
1982 / 83 
1983 / 84 
1984 / 85 
1985/ 86 
1986 / 87 
1987 / 88 
0.5 0 
0.90 
1. 30 
1.40 
1.30 
2.50 
3.25 
3.25 
4 . 50 
0.68 
0.90 
1.30 
1 . 40 
2.1 0 
2.5 0 
2.93 
4.10 
4.50 
0 .50 
0 . 55 
0.96 
1.30 
1.30 
2.50 
2.50 
2.86 
4 . 50 
Ee: exchange rate for cotton; Eg: exchange rate for groundnuts; 
E0 : official exchange rate (used for wheat ) . 
Source: El Badawi (1989 ) . 
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World Prices 
World prices of cotton and groundnuts (export crops ) and 
cottonseed are f . o.b. prices from which cost s (transportat ion, 
marketing, processing, etc.) are subtracted to get the border 
price equivalent at the farmgate. World prices o f wheat 
( importable ) and fertilizer (impo rted input ) are c . i .f . prices 
to which costs are added to obtain the bo rder price equivalent 
at the farmgate. 
World prices of cotton, groundnuts and wheat have been 
estimated by dividing t he t otal value of e xpo rts, in f . o .b. 
valuation, o f each crop by the total volume exported (for 
cotton and groundnuts ) and by the total vo lume impo rted (for 
wheat) for each year. Total value and quantities have been 
obta ined f r om the Bank of Sudan Annual Report (various 
issues) . Total values are expressed in Sudanes e pounds (LS) 
and total quantities o f groundnuts exported and of wheat 
imported are e xpresse d in t ons , thus giving prices i n LS /ton. 
However, the v o lume of cotton e xported i s expressed in bales 
and has been converted into ton s by multiplyi ng the number of 
bales by 0 .1 91 (1 bale=l91 kilograms and 1 ton=l OOO 
ki lograms ) . Values and volume of cotto n export ed are also 
d ivided into long s taple cotton and other cotton (include s 
medium staple and short staple cotto n ) . To get the world 
price e xpressed in LS/ ton, t o tal value of cotton (long staple 
+ others) is divided by the total volume of cot ton e xported. 
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Table 4.7 shows total values and quantities for 
groundnuts and wheat and world prices expressed in LS/ton for 
the period 1980-1988. 
Table 4 . 8 shows values and quantities (in bales ) for long 
staple and other cottons and the price of cotton after 
conversion from bales to tons for the same period. 
Table 4.7: World prices of groundnuts and wheat (LS/ton ) 
Year 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
Quantity 
(Ton) 
22093 . 0 
94347.0 
88900.0 
18037.0 
22453.0 
13260.0 
1090 . 0 
7283.0 
69080.0 
Groundnuts 
Value 
(LSOOO) 
5924.0 
66457.0 
33191.0 
16511.0 
26773.0 
23149.0 
2466.0 
10056.0 
86538.0 
Price 
(LS/Ton) 
268.139 
704.389 
373.352 
915.396 
1192.402 
1745.777 
2262.385 
1380.750 
1252.721 
Quantity 
(Ton) 
156081 . 0 
229890 . 0 
149138.0 
198268 . 0 
140922.0 
193115.0 
116509.0 
217660.0 
234619 . 0 
Price=Value in LS'OOOs I quantity in tons. 
Wheat 
Value 
(LSOOO) 
18447.0 
26876.0 
22332.0 
52162 . 0 
382 4 9.0 
78600.0 
52022.0 
199500.0 
224886.0 
Source: Bank of Sudan Annual Report (various issues). 
Price 
(LS / Ton ) 
118.189 
116.908 
149 . 741 
263 . 088 
271.420 
411.270 
446.506 
916.567 
958.516 
To get the world prices of cotton, groundnuts and wheat 
in U.S dollars (US$), the world price in domestic currency for 
each crop is divided by its respective exchange rate (shown in 
Table 4.6). The world price of cottonseed is also obtained by 
dividing the value of cottonseed by the total quantity 
exported. The data has been obtained from the FAO Trade 
Yearbook (various issues) and is in f . o . b. valuation. 
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Table 4 . 8: World prices of cotton (LS/ton) 
Year 
1980 
198 1 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
198 6 
1987 
1988 
Total Quantity 
in Bales 
617092 
343320 
468064 
1128541 
967122 
529314 
936907 
938788 
816197 
Total Value 
LS' OOOs 
115441 
68657 
121130 
395969 
4 05000 
374 260 
366721 
455195 
978435 
Total Quantity 
in Tons 
117855.615 
65569.137 
89393.430 
215534.950 
184706.264 
101091.291 
178935.638 
179308.508 
155881.780 
Quantity in Tons =Quantity in Bales x 0.191 . 
Price 
LS / Ton 
979.512 
1047.093 
1355.021 
1837.145 
2192.671 
3702. 1 98 
2049.458 
2538.614 
6276.776 
Price(LS/Ton) = Total Value in LS'OOOs/Total Quantity in Tons. 
Source: Bank of Sudan Annual Reports (various issues ) . 
Value of cottonseed (FAO estimates ) is in US dollars 
(US$ ) and the quantities exported (FAO unofficial figures ) are 
in tons . Prices have been converted from foreign currency to 
domestic currency by using the official exchange rate (E0) . 
Table 4.9 shows the values and quantities of cottonseed 
and the price of cottonseed both in US$ / ton and is in LS/ ton 
for the period 1980-1988. No figures were available for value 
and quantity exported of cottonseed for 1981. 1980 figures 
were used . 
C.i.f. prices of fert ilizer, in domestic currency, was 
obtained from the Sudan Gezira Board (SGB) off ice in Wad -
Medani, Sudan for the period 1984 / 85 to 1987/ 88. The prices 
of fertili zer for the period 1979/ 80 to 1983 / 84 were estimated 
by using the percentage change in f ield prices (i.e prices 
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paid by the farmers ) from year to year. It is important to 
note that the SGB did not import any fertilizer in 1987/ 88 and 
therefore the domestic price was used for that year. World 
price of fertilizer in domestic currency has been converted to 
foreign currency (US$) by using the official exchange rate 
Table 4. 10 presents field prices of fertilizer in LS/ ton 
and c.i.f. prices in LS/ton and US$ /ton for the period 1979/80 
to 1987 / 88. 
Table 4.9: World prices of cottonseed (LS/ton) 
Year 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
Quantity 
(Ton) 
1558 
1558 1 
3000 
9000 
8000 
5900 
4000 
6000 
7000 
1 1980 figures. 
Value 
(000$) 
216 
216 1 
420 
1450 
1450 
890 
650 
850 
1100 
Price 
($/Ton) 
138.64 
138.64 
140.00 
161.11 
181.25 
150.85 
162.50 
141.67 
157.14 
Eo 
0.50 
0.55 
0 . 96 
1 . 30 
1.30 
2.50 
2.50 
2.86 
4.50 
Price ($/Ton) = Value in $ ' 000 I Quantity in Tons . 
Price 
(LS/Ton) 
69.32 
76.25 
134.40 
269.44 
235.63 
377.13 
406.25 
405.18 
707.13 
Price (LS/Ton) = Price in $ / Ton x Official Exchange Rate (Eo) . 
Source: FAO Trade Yearbook (various issues ) . 
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Table 4.10: World prices of fertilizer 
Year 
1979 / 80 
1980 / 81 
1981 / 82 
1982 / 83 
1983 / 84 
1984 / 85 
1985 / 86 
1986 / 87 
1987 / 88 
Field Price 
(LS/ Ton) 
160.00 
193.00 
344.00 
350.00 
334 . 00 
330.00 
1020.00 
611.60 
648.20 
C. I.F. 
(LS/ Ton) 
104. 78 1 
126.39 1 
225. 27 1 
229. 20 1 
218. 72 1 
216.10 
612.34 
379.30 
648.202 
0.50 
0 . 55 
0 . 96 
1. 30 
1.30 
2.50 
2.50 
2.86 
4.50 
C.I.F. 
($ / Ton ) 
209.56 
229.80 
234.66 
176.31 
168.25 
86.44 
244.94 
132.62 
144 . 04 
1 Calculated as percentage change of field price. 
2 1987/ 88 field price. 
E0 : Official exchange rate reported from El Badawi (1988). 
Source: Sudan Gezira Board, 1989. 
Adjustment of Border Prices to Farmgate 
Border Prices Evaluated at the Official Exchange Rate 
Data on transportation, handling, processing, marketing 
and other costs has been taken from a World Bank report on 
export development on the Sudan (Moe and Haddad, 1 983 ) . The 
report presents price structures for export of both long 
staple cotton and medium staple cotton (lint ) , groundnuts and 
cottonseed and price structure for wheat and fertilizer 
imports for 1982. It includes a detailed breakdown of costs 
f o r each commodity (in LS/ ton) from world price t o farmgate 
price (see Appendix B for details ) . Figures f o r the years 
preceding and proceeding 1982 have been est i mated by using the 
CPI (cost of living price index) with 1980 base year. CPI 
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figures (1980-1988) have been obtained from Hassan (1989) (see 
Appendix D, Table D.7). 
To obtain the border price equivalents for groundnuts and 
cottonseeds (exports), costs are subtracted from their world 
prices expressed in domestic currency. Costs are added to the 
world price of wheat (importable) and fertilizer (import ) to 
get the border price evaluated at the farmgate . This gives 
border prices at farmgate evaluated at the official exchange 
rate for each crop respectively. 
In the case of cotton, farmgate prices refer to raw 
cotton while world prices refer to cotton lint. This makes it 
necessary to adjust the world price accordingly. The ginning 
process of raw cotton produces cotton lint, cottonseed, waste 
and scarto (linters) . To obtain border price equivalents of 
cotton , we need to convert world prices of cotton lint to 
world prices of the raw cotton equivalent of lint. 
Table 4.11: Breakdown of seedcotton 
Components ELS Percent MS Percent MS Percent 
of 315 lb of 315 lb of 315 lb 
(Shambat) (Akal a ) 
Lint 107 lb 34.00% 94 lb 29.8% 117 lb 37 . 2% 
Seed 200 lb 63 . 50% 210 lb 66.7% 190 lb 60.3% 
Scarto 4 lb 1.25% 4 lb l. 3% 
Waste 4 lb 1.25% 7 lb 2.2% 8 lb 2.5% 
Total 315 lb 100.00% 315 lb 100.0% 315 lb 100 . 0% 
lb: pounds. 
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The breakdown of raw cotton into lint, seed, waste and 
scarto depends on the variety of cotton. Table 4.11 shows the 
breakdown of 315 pounds (1 kantar) of raw cotton into its four 
components according to variety. 
Since long staple cotton makes up between 65% and 95% of 
the total production of cotton in the Gezira Scheme (see Table 
4.4 ) and more than 50% of the total volume of cotton exports 
(see Table D.5 in Appendix D), the breakdown of long staple 
cotton has been used. This means that cottonseed constitutes 
63.5% of 1 kantar of seedcotton whi le lint constitutes 34% and 
waste and scarto 2.5%. Due to the lack of data on prices of 
scarto and waste, they have not been included in the 
calculation of the price of raw cotton equivalent of lint. 
However, since scarto and was te make up only 2 . 5% of the 
composition of raw cotton and their prices are usually low, 
their exclusion is not expected to bias the results. 
The cost of transportation, ginnery and other costs ( in 
LS / ton) is subtracted from the export price (LS/ ton) of lint 
cotton to get the border price equivalent of lint. To get the 
border price equivalent of raw cotton at the farmgate, 34% of 
the border price equivale nt of lint is added to 63.5% of the 
border price equivalent of cottonseed. The border price 
equivalent of cotton obtained is the price evaluated at the 
official exchange rate for cotton. As noted previously , the 
border price equivalent of cottonseed is evaluated at the 
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official exchange rate (E0) while the border price equivalent 
of cotton at domestic currency is evaluated at the exchange 
rate that applies to cotton (Ee) . The same holds true for 
groundnuts and wheat, i.e., border prices are evaluated at the 
exchange rate for groundnuts (~) and for wheat (E0 ) 
respectively. 
Border Price Equivalent Evaluated at the Equilibrium 
Exchange Rate 
To obtain the border price equivalent evaluated at the 
equilibrium nominal exchange rate (E. ), costs are added or 
subtracted (depending upon whether they are imports or 
exports) from world prices evaluated at E·. The method by 
which E. is estimated is explained in a later section. 
World prices of cotton, groundnuts and wheat are 
converted to domestic currency evaluated at E. by multiplying 
the world price by the ratio of E. to the official exchange 
rate that applies to each crop respectively. For cottonseed, 
fertilizer and wheat, prices are multiplied by E./E0 (E0 being 
the official exchange rate) to convert them to domestic 
currency evaluated at E. (see Table 4.1). 
World prices in domestic currency evaluated at E. are then 
converted to border price equivalents in LS evaluated at E. by 
subtracting costs ( for each respective product) in the case 
of cotton, groundnuts and cottonseed and by adding costs in 
the case of wheat and fertilizer. For cotton, 34% of the 
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border price equivalent of lint evaluated at E. i s adde d to 
63 . 5% o f the border price equivalent of cottonseed evaluated 
at E. to obtain the border price equivalent of cotton in 
domestic currency evaluated at E· . 
Border price equivalents for cotton, groundnuts, whea t, 
cottonseed and fertilizer in domestic currency evaluated at 
the off icial exchange rate (for each commodity respectively ) 
and evaluated at the equilibrium exchange rate are presented 
(in LS/ton) in Table 4.12 for cotton , groundnuts and wheat and 
in Table 4.13 for cottonseed and fertilizer for the period 
1980-1988. 
Table 4.12: Border price equivalents for cotton, groundnuts 
and wheat 
Year Border Price @ E0 Border Price @ E 
Cotton Groundnuts Whea t Cotton Groundnuts Wheat 
1980 240.666 138.23 0 163.640 346 .241 122.457 161 . 821 
1981 249.040 416.962 169.606 187.967 268.258 174.764 
1982 3 42 . 045 185.702 216.710 292.479 134.007 231 . 390 
1983 480.810 524.204 392.774 578.796 628.820 354.603 
1984 553.608 682.443 388.342 746.405 387.182 346.251 
1985 956.796 998.355 579.995 1286.404 1382.425 596.665 
1986 467 . 854 1295.691 659 . 428 554.772 1565.941 646.218 
1987 529.880 666.406 1224.216 810.301 612.523 1495.568 
1988 1515.204 467.710 1363.407 2416 . 430 904.770 2318.769 
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Table 4.13: Border price equivalents for cottonseed and 
fertilizer 
Year Border Price @ E0 Border Price @ E* 
cottonseed fertilizer cottonseed fertilizer 
1980 33.06680 132.9910 52.47640 162.3294 
1981 33.40808 161 . 1195 55.59048 197.8875 
1982 72.17600 272.5335 94.57600 310.0785 
1983 120 . 69390 288 . 0600 162.58250 333 .9 000 
1984 127 . 61370 291.6290 178.36370 338 .737 9 
1985 211.78870 318.1120 294.75620 365 . 6540 
1986 210.37450 760.0240 337.12450 951 . 07 4 0 
1987 182.93700 543 . 4850 335.94080 686.7171 
1988 357.49870 893.5750 604.20850 1119.7240 
Nonagricultural Price Index {PNA) 
The calculation of the nominal rate of protection (NRP ) 
and the effective rate of protection {ERP) is also based on 
data on the nonagricultural price index {PNA) . The 
nonagricultural price index is used to measure relative 
prices. PNA index is based on CPI data and is made up of 
indices of prices for the tradable (PNA{T)) and nontradable 
{PNA{NT )) components of the nonagricultural sector . 
PNA = a PNA{T) + {1 - a) PNA{NT) 
where 
PNA: the nonagricultural price index 
PNA{T): the nonagricultural price index for tradables 
PNA{NT): the nonagricultural price index for nontradables 
a: the share of tradables in the nonagricultural sector 
A calculated PNA index has been borrowed from El Badawi 
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(1 989) . The data has been rebased with 1980 base year (by 
dividing all years by 1980 prices) as is shown in Table 4.14. 
The quantity weights used by El Badawi (1989) for the tradable 
and nontradable sectors are 30% (a) and 70% (1-a) 
respectively . 
Table 4.14: Calculat ion of PNA 
Year PNA PNA (T ) PNA (NT ) PNA PNA(T) PNA(NT) 
(base year 1970) (base year 1980) 
1980 430.25 387 . 90 448.40 100.00 100 . 00 100.00 
1981 532.63 479.50 555.40 123.79 123 . 61 123.86 
1982 685.00 622.00 712 . 00 159.26 160.35 158 . 79 
1983 879.80 813.30 908.30 204.70 209.67 202.56 
1984 1144. 56 1036.90 1190.70 266.07 267 . 31 265.54 
1985 1671.81 1 486 . 80 1751 . 10 388.35 383.30 390.52 
1986 205 4 .34 1861.70 2136.90 477.58 479.94 476.56 
1987 2654 . 74 2454.40 2740 . 60 617.66 632.74 611.20 
1988 3466.69 3214.90 3574.60 806.67 828.80 797.19 
Source: El Badawi (1989 ) . 
PNA is also measured at the equilibrium nominal exchange 
rate (E' ) , in the absence of trade intervention, t o adjust for 
exchange rate overvaluation and distortions due to trade 
policies. This corrected nonagricultural price index (PNA. ) is 
computed by adjusting the tradable component of PNA as follows 
PNA' =a E•/E0 PNA(T) /(l +tm) + (1-a) PNAT(NT) 
where 
E': equilibrium nominal exchange rate 
E0 : offic ial exchange rate 
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tm: equivalent import tariff 
a: 0 . 3 
Time series data on the official exchange rate is 
obtained from El Badawi (1989) . Calculations for the 
equilibrium nominal exchange rate (E") is presented in the next 
section. The equivalent import tariff (tm) is also borrowed 
from El Badawi (1987) where it was used as a proxy for tax on 
imports. Table 4.15 presents PNA
0
, the nonagricultural price 
index, corrected for exchange rate overvaluation and 
distortions resulting from trade polic ies. 
Table 4.15: Calculation of PNA
0 
Year Eo E E /E0 tm l+tm PNA(T) PNA(NT) PNA 
1980 0.50 0.64 1.28 0.38 1.38 100.00 100.00 97.83 
1981 0.55 0 . 71 1.29 0.41 1.41 123.61 123.86 120.66 
1982 0.96 1 . 12 1.17 0.22 1. 22 160 .35 158.79 157 . 15 
1983 1. 30 1. 56 1. 20 0.22 1. 22 209.67 202.56 203.66 
1984 1. 30 1. 58 1.22 0.48 1.48 267.31 265.54 251.74 
1985 2 . 50 3.05 1.22 0.54 1.54 383.29 390.52 364.46 
1986 2.50 3.28 1.31 0.37 1. 37 479.94 476.56 471 . 06 
1987 2.86 3 .94 1.38 0.36 1. 36 632.74 611.20 620. 12 
1988 4.50 6.07 1.35 0.36 1. 36 828.80 797.19 804.64 
PNA = [ 0 . 3x (E / E0 ) (PNA (T) /l+tm)] +O. 7xPNA (NT) . 
Source: El Badawi (1987) and El Badawi (1989) 
Estimation of the Nominal Equilibrium Exchange Rate 
The equilibrium nominal exchange rate (E0 ) is "used as a 
benchmark value against which to measure the extent of the 
overvaluation of the currency" (Dethier, 1988). It is 
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expressed in Sudanese Pounds per U.S. Dollar (LS/US$ ) . The 
methodology used to compute the equilibrium exchange rate is 
based on the elasticities approach. E. may be defined as "the 
rate that would prevail for a sustainable leve l of current 
account deficit and if there was free trade, i.e., if tariffs 
and other trade taxes were removed" (Dethier, 1988 ) . This is 
a long run equilibrium concept. 
The formula used to compute E* is that used by Dethier 
(1988) in his study of the agricultural pricing pol icies in 
Egypt. 
where 
E·: equilibrium nominal exchange rate 
Qd: demand for foreign exchange 
Q5 : supply of foreign exchange 
dQ0 : (Qd -Qs) the current account deficit for a particular year 
in units of foreign exchange 
e 5 : elasticity of supply of foreign exchange 
ed: elasticity of demand for foreign exchange 
E0 : official exchange rate 
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where 
tm: implicit tariff equivalent 
t~: implicit export tax 
Due to the lack of data, the elast icity o f suppl y o f 
foreign exchange is assumed t o be one and the elast icity o f 
demand f o r foreign exchange is assumed to be e qual to two . 
This has been used by Dethier (1988 ) and suggested by Krueger, 
Schiff and Valdes (1988 ) . 
To obtain the equilibrium nominal exchange rate, the 
o fficial exchange rate is c orrected f o r imbalance in the 
external account and then for trade policies. This gives E• 
wi t h external balance and no trade distortions. 
The demand for f o reign e x change Od is derived from demand 
for imports (imports + invisible debits ) and the supply of 
foreign exchange 05 is derived from the demand for exports 
(exports + invisible c redits ) . Data for the calculation of Qd 
and 05 and the defic it of the current a c count o f the balance o f 
payments is obtained fro m the Current Accoun t Balance o f Goods 
and Services f o r 198 0-1988 for the Sudan from t he IMF 
International Financial Statistics (expressed in US$ millions ) 
and from the Bank of Sudan Annual Report (see Appendix D, 
Table D. 6 ) . 
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Table 4.16 : Calculation of the equilibrium nominal e x change 
rate E. 
Year 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1687.8 
2402 . 3 
1351.4 
1344.5 
1113 . 0 
1071.2 
956.4 
1 086 . 5 
1360.7 
1239. 6 
1584.9 
1023 . 8 
1055.l 
1064.1 
1079.1 
644. 9 
590.9 
814. 9 
dQo 
448.2 
817.4 
327.6 
289 .4 
48.9 
-7 .9 
311.5 
4 95.6 
545.8 
806. 9 
1095.2 
277.7 
46 3 .4 
666.0 
717. 9 
482.7 
544.1 
686.4 
0.38 
0. 41 
0.22 
0.22 
0. 48 
0.54 
0 . 37 
0.36 
0.36 
dQ 1 = [(tm/l+tm)Qdx2] - [(tl/ l -ti)Q$xl] 
E
0 
= { [ ( dQ0 + dQ1) / ( e 5 x Q5 + ed x Qd) ] + 1} E0 
0.09 
0.16 
0. 17 
0.02 
0 . 05 
0 . 03 
0.05 
0.05 
0.04 
E 
0.50 
0.55 
0.96 
1 . 30 
1.3 0 
2.50 
2 . 50 
2.86 
4 .50 
0 . 636 
0.71 5 
1.116 
1 . 561 
1.582 
3.05 1 
3.276 
3.936 
6.068 
Source : El Badawi (1987) and the I MF International Financial 
Statistics. 
Table 4.16 shows the calculation of the equilibri um 
nominal e xchange ra te E
0 
for the period 1 980- 1988 . 
Estimatio n of Value Added 
Value Added at Domestic Prices 
Value added at domestic prices (VAd ) is defined as t he 
farmgate price minus the value of tradable inputs. Cost o f 
production data and farmgate prices of agricultural products 
are needed to estimate the value added for cot ton, groundnuts 
and wheat at domestic prices. 
VAd = f armgate p rice - cost of tradable inputs 
Cost o f Production Data at Domestic Prices 
Official data on the cost of production was obtained from 
the Gezira Current Statistics for 1978 /79 -1987 / 88 (Sudan 
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Gezira Board, 1989) prepared by the Sudan Gezira Board 
Planning and Social Economics Research Unit. This bulletin 
contains time series data on production, yields, areas grown, 
quantities of inputs used, cost of production, returns and 
prices of both agricultural inputs and outputs. The 
agricultural products covered in this bulletin are cotton, 
groundnuts, wheat and sorghum. This study focused only on 
cotton, gro undnuts and wheat as sorghum is grown mainly for 
private consumption. 
Cost of production data is expressed in Sudanese Pounds 
per feddan (LS / feddan) . Cost data for each crop includes cost 
of tradable inputs (seeds , fertilizers, herbicides , 
insecticides, machinery, etc . ) and of nontradable inputs 
(labor, services and other costs incurred by the farmer ) . The 
data is broken down into different farming activities (land 
preparation, agricultural operations, harvest and post harvest 
operations, materials used and services, transport, land and 
water c harges and other costs). 
The data has been converted from LS / feddan to LS/ton 
using total area harvested and total production of each c rop 
t o obtain a measure of value added in LS/ t on. Since the 
calculation of value added requires only the cost of traded 
inputs, the cost of traded inputs has been converted from 
LS/feddan to LS / ton. Cost of machinery is obtained by adding 
up the cost of activities using machinery. Appendix C, Tables 
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C.l, C.2 and C . 3 give a breakdown of costs of traded inputs 
for cotton, groundnuts and wheat for the period 1976/77 to 
1987/88. 
In order to convert from LS/feddan to LS/ton, production 
(expressed in tons) is divided by the area (expressed in 
feddans) to obtain a yield for each crop expressed in 
tons/feddan . The relevant cost data in LS/feddan is then 
divided by the yield to get the cost in LS/ton. In the case 
of cotton, production is expressed in kantars . To obtain 
production in tons, production in kantars is multiplied by 
0.143 (1 kantar = 0.143 tons). 
Appendix A shows areas grown (in feddans), volume of 
production (in tons converted from kantars for cotton) and 
yields in tons per feddan for cotton, groundnuts and wheat f or 
the period 1979/80-1987/88. 
In addition to the costs of production data in LS /feddan 
converted to LS / ton, Appendix C (Tables C.l, C.2 and C.3) also 
shows the value added at domestic prices in LS/ton obtained by 
subtracting cost of tradable inputs from the f armgate price of 
cot ton, groundnuts and wheat respectively. 
Table 4.17 shows the value added at domestic prices in 
Sudanese pounds per ton for cotton, groundnuts and wheat. 
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Table 4.17: Value added at domestic prices (LS/ton) for 
cotton, groundnuts and wheat 
Year Value Added for Cotton Value Added for Value Added for 
LS MS Average Groundnuts Wheat 
1980 364.41 224.75 343.74 64.71 47.75 
1981 279 . 44 139.78 258.77 247.47 - 13.68 
1982 366.59 226 . 92 348 . 00 142.59 50.51 
1983 385.34 245.67 353.91 295.49 148.30 
1984 422.96 248.38 369.89 380 . 70 139.03 
1985 635.24 432.73 583 . 22 531.55 479.03 
1986 557.40 452.65 551 . 04 1015.14 267 . 62 
1987 1092.33 882.84 1048.55 1128.47 451.81 
1988 1218.52 869.35 1086.18 1254.52 638.84 
Value Added at Border Prices 
To calculate the total effective rate of protection, the 
value added with border prices of agricultural products and 
costs of tradable inputs evaluated at border prices is 
required. Border prices are converted to the domestic 
currency at the official exchange rate for each respective 
crop and at the equilibrium nominal exchange rate (E*) as seen 
in the earlier sections . 
Value Added at border prices {VAb) evaluated at the 
official exchange rate for each crop may be defined as : 
VAb = border prices of the agricultural commodity evaluated at 
Ea - cost of tradable inputs in border prices evaluated 
at E0 
where 
VAb: value added at border prices 
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E
3
: the exchange rate that applies to each agricultural 
commodity (Ee for cotton, Eg for groundnuts and E0 for 
wheat) 
E0 : the official exchange rate 
As mentioned before, an important assumption is that the 
purchase of traded inputs at border prices does not change the 
technological coefficients. This means that "there is no 
substitution between labor and mechanized operations and 
between organic and chemical fertilizers" (Dethier , 1988) 
Cost of Production Data at Border Prices 
In order to estimate the value added at border prices for 
each crop, border prices of traded inputs have been computed 
as follows: 
l. Border prices for mac hinery, insecticides, herbicides and 
seeds are assumed to be equal to domestic prices. In the case 
of machinery, due to the unavailability of price data on 
machinery, costs of mechanized activities have been used. 
Border prices for seeds have been estimated but in order 
to cal culate costs per feddan or costs per ton for each 
agricultural product, quantities used per feddan in the 
production of each crop was needed. No such information was 
available. 
Prices of herbicides and insecticides were available by 
kind, in addition to quantities used per feddan for each crop . 
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However, due to the detailed breakdown of the prices of these 
inputs by type, it was extremely difficult to calculate the 
costs per feddan using the data given. 
2 . Data was available to calculate the costs per feddan for 
fertilizer for cotton and wheat at border prices for the 
period under study; groundnuts do not use fertilizer . The 
bor der p r ice equivalent for fertilizer evaluated at the 
official exchange rate (E0 ) and at the equilibrium nominal 
e x change rate (E. ) was explained in an earlier section . 
Cost of fertilizer per feddan for cotton and wheat at 
border prices was calculated by multiplying the c.i.f price of 
fertilizer by the quantity of fertilizer used (in tons) and 
then dividing by the area (in feddans) over which fertilizer 
was applied for each crop. To obtain costs per ton at border 
prices evaluated at the official exchange rate, costs per 
feddan were divided by the yield (ton/feddan) for cotton and 
wheat respectively. Appendix C, Tables C.4 and C.5, shows the 
cost of fertilizer for cotton and wheat respectively in LS/ ton 
using border price of fertilizer evaluated at the official 
exchange rate for the period 1980-1988. 
Value added at border prices evaluated at the official 
exchange rate is obtained by subtracting the cost of tractable 
inputs at border prices evaluated at Eo from the border price 
equivalent of each crop evaluated at the exchange rate that 
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applies to that crop. 
Tables 4.18 shows value added at border prices evaluated 
at the official exchange rate for cotton, groundnuts and wheat 
respectively for 1980 to 1988 . As mentioned above, only the 
cost of fertilizer has been adjusted using its border price 
evaluated at E0 . Costs of the other tractable inputs remain at 
their domestic prices. 
Table 4.18: Value added for cotton, groundnuts and wheat 
at border prices (LS/ton) evaluated at their 
respective exchange rates 
Year Value Added for Valu e Added for Value Added for 
Cotton at EC Groundnuts at Eg Wheat at E0 
1980 1 10 . 1354 124.9426 98.4911 
1981 48.0663 402 . 4334 6.3236 
1982 127.5150 148.2973 61.4082 
1983 262.1971 489.6915 270.8936 
1984 234 . 3557 643.1431 198.3629 
1985 647.6187 941.9040 579 . 9953 
1986 -412 . 3100 1190.8290 259.9261 
1987 - 81.9508 562.8735 909.8653 
1988 642.8428 322.2351 954.6188 
Value Added (LS / Ton ) Border price - Total Cost of Tradable 
Inputs . 
Value added at border prices evaluated at the equilibrium 
nominal exchange rate E. is calculated as follows: 
Border prices of crops converted to domestic currency at E0 and 
border prices of traded inputs (namely fertilizer) valued at E0 
are used to estimate the value added at border prices 
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evaluated at E0 • Cost of traded inputs (with the exception of 
fertilizer) have been obtained by multiplying the relevant 
data by E
0
/E0 • 
The border prices expressed in domestic currency 
evaluated at E
0 
for cotton, groundnuts and wheat are estimated 
in the second section. The cost of traded inputs multiplied 
by E
0
/E0 are obtained for cotton, g r oundnuts and wheat 
respectively. 
Value Added at border prices eva l uated at E
0 
; border price 
equivalent of the crop evaluated at E
0 
- cost of traded inputs 
at border prices evaluated at E
0
• 
Table 4.19 show the value added at border prices 
evaluated at E
0 
for cotton, groundnuts and wheat for the period 
1980 - 1988. 
Table 4.19: Value added for cotton, groundnuts and wheat at 
border prices (LS/Ton) evaluated at E
0 
Year Value Added for Value Added for Value Added for 
Cotton at E
0 
Groundnuts at E
0 
Wheat at E
0 
1980 181.2698 105.4493 79.6766 
1981 -68.2201 249.5023 -32.1124 
1982 43.7287 90.3682 51.9069 
1983 318.6206 587 . 4051 209.9225 
1984 361.2966 339.4169 117.3759 
1985 913 . 1400 1313.5540 596.6646 
1986 -590.1610 1428.3620 130.9158 
1987 -23 . 3611 469.8945 1072.8090 
1988 1255.6060 708 . 5404 1778.0600 
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The cost of traded inputs , with the exclusion of 
fertilizer, have been converted from costs at domestic prices 
to costs at border prices evaluated at E' by multiplying costs 
by the ratio E./E0 for cotton, groundnuts and wheat 
respectively. In the case of fertilizer, cost of fertilizer 
for cotton and wheat, in LS/ton, was calculated by using the 
border price equivalent of fertilizer evaluated at E
0
• 
Tables C.6 and C.7 {Appendix C) show the cost in LS / ton 
of fertilizer used in the production of cotton and wheat 
respectively at border price of fertilizer at E. for the period 
1980 - 1988. The procedure used to obtain cost of fertilizer is 
the same as the one used for the cost of fertilizer at E0 . 
Estimation of Rates of Protection 
Nominal Rate of Protection {NRP) 
NRP measures the magnitude of the impact of direct and 
indirect policies on agricultural prices. 
Direct Nominal Rate of Protection {NRPD) 
NRPD measures the direct effect of price policy (price 
controls , export taxes, quotas, etc . ) on relative prices. It 
can be defined as the proportional difference between the 
relative domestic price and the relative border price of 
agricultural commodities (Krueger, Schiff and Valdes, 1988) 
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where 
Pd: the domestic producer (farmgate ) price of the tradable 
agricultural product 
Pd / PNA : the relative price at the actual intervention level 
~: the border price equivalent of the crop measured at the 
official exchange rate (and adjusted for transportation, 
storage and other costs ) 
PNA: the nonagricultural price index 
As noted earlier, in the measurement o f the border prices (Pb ) 
of the agricultural products under study, the "official" 
exchange rate used differs from one crop to the other. Pb is 
deflated by the PNA . 
Indirect Nominal Rate of Protec tion (NRPI ) 
NRPI measures the effect of exchange rate overvaluation 
and trade policy which are indirect f o rms of intervention that 
alter relative prices (Dethier, 1988 ) . 
where 
and 
Pd/ PNA- (E • / Ea) Pd/ PNA • 1/ PNA- (E 0 /Ea) / PNA • 
NRPI= =~~~~~~~~~ 
(E • /Ea) Pd/ PNA • ( E • /Ea) / PNA • 
PNA·=a(E. / E
0
) PNA(T) +(1-a)PNA (NT) 
l+tm 
a: share of tradables in the nonagricultural price index (0 .3 ) 
t m: equivalent tariff rate on nonagri cultural tradables 
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E·: equilibrium nominal exchange rate 
PNA (T ) : index of prices o f nonagricultural tradables 
PNA (NT ) : index of prices of nonagricultural nontradabl es 
E
3
: the exchange rate that applies to each crop (Ee , Eg and E0 
for cotton, groundnuts and wheat respect i ve l y ) 
Thus the relative price in the absence o f indirect 
interventions becomes (E
0
/ E0 ) (PA/ PNA
0
) i.e. , "to c orrect for 
indirect intervention, relative border prices should be 
evaluated at the equilibrium nominal exchange rat e and 
deflated by a nonagricultural price index PNA0 to correct 
prices of tradables for exchange rate o vervaluatio n and trade 
policy distortions" (Dethier , 1988) . 
As is apparent from the above equation, NRPI i.e., the 
incidence o f indirect interventions, is the same for all crops 
and d epends on (E. / E0 ) (level of exchange rate overvaluation) 
and on tm, the impact of trade policies in PNA (T ) 
where 
To tal Nominal Rate of Pro tection (NRPT ) 
NRPT= _P_d_/ P_'N.._' A_-_(_E_._/ _E_a _) P_b_/_P_U_'.A_• 
(E• / Ea) Pb/ PNA • 
£ 3 : the exc hange rate that applies t o eac h c rop (Ect Eg, E0 for 
cotton, groundnuts and wheat respectively ) 
Si nce NRPT is not equal t o the sum o f NRPD and NRPI, the 
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direct nominal rate of protection (NRPD ) has been adjusted as 
follows: 
p I PNA - p I PNA. 
NRPd=NRPT-NRPI= d b 
(E• /Ea) Pb/ PNA • 
where NRPd is the adjusted NRPD which "measures the impact 
(Pd/ PNA - Pb/ PNA) of the direct policies as a percent of 
Pd
0
/ PNA
0
, the relative price which would prevai l in the absence 
of all interventions and with E = E• (Krueger, Schiff and 
Valdes, 1988) . 
Tables 4.20, 4.21 and 4.22 present NRPD, NRPI and NRPT 
for cotton, groundnuts and wheat respectively for the period 
1980-1988. The formulas used are presented below . The 
exchange rate Ea corresponds to Ee, Eg and E0 for c o tton, 
groundnuts and wheat respectively . 
Farmgateprice-BorderpriceatEa 
NRPD= . 
borderpr icea tEa 
d 
Farmgateprice/PNA-BorderpriceatEa/PNA. NRP =~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~=--~~ 
( E ·I Ea) Border pr i cea tEal PNA • 
NRPI=-1_/_PN._~_-~(E_._/_E~a)_/_P_U_~_· 
(E •/ Ea) PNA • 
Farmga tepr ice/ PNA- (E• I Ea) Borderpr icea tE I PNA • 
NRPT= a 
(E• I Ea) Borderpr iceatEa l PNA • 
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Table 4.20: NRP estimates for cotton 
Year NRPD NRPd NRPI NRPT 
1980 0.959769 0 . 716536 -0.23573 0.497786 
1981 0.893873 1 . 072336 0.23553 1.339943 
1982 0.703926 0 . 790941 0.14539 0.951655 
1983 0.212744 0 . 185441 -0.10708 0.082878 
1984 0.253829 0 . 153255 -0.22155 -0.023950 
1985 -0.069070 -0 . 103560 -0. 23075 -0.283890 
1986 2.195526 2.132246 -0 . 02266 2.123101 
1987 2.185737 1.813422 -0.17184 1.638295 
1988 0.263037 0.192645 -0.26051 -0 . 066000 
Table 4.21: NRP estimates for groundnuts 
Year NRPD NRPd NRPI NRPT 
1980 -0 .43572 -0.47598 0.03940 -0.41348 
1981 -0 .37164 -0 .49125 0.23553 -0.22364 
1982 -0.03070 -0 .05049 0.14538 0.11022 
1983 -0.37047 -0.33532 - 0.10708 -0. 43788 
1984 -0 . 38456 -0.55520 0.25749 -0.22609 
1985 -0 .41103 -0.36661 -0 .23075 -0.54694 
1986 -0 . 13559 -0 .13166 -0.11889 -0.23836 
1987 0 . 84872 0.89085 0.04475 0.93146 
1988 1.99331 1 . 47215 -0 .26051 1.21350 
Table 4 . 22: NRP estimates for wheat 
Year NRPD NRPd NRPI NRPT 
1980 -0.27584 -0.29614 -0.00645 -0.28052 
1981 -0.05663 -0.07710 - 0.06648 -0. 11935 
1982 0 . 06133 0.04309 -0.10131 -0.04619 
1983 - 0.28712 -0.30002 0.02685 -0.26797 
1984 -0 .07298 -0 . 14550 0.11977 0 . 03804 
1985 0.20700 0 . 12743 -0 .0.984 0.08809 
1986 0.06152 0.04848 0 . 01643 0.07896 
1987 - 0.37102 -0.28434 -0 . 22535 -0 .51276 
1988 -0 .2658 0 -0.13400 -0.50043 -0.63322 
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The NRPD estimates for cotton, groundnuts and wheat 
measure the deviation of the producer domestic price from the 
border price equivalent evaluated at the farmgate. NRPD 
estimates for cotton are positive for the period under study, 
except for 1985 . This indicates positive protection of cotton 
i . e., that producers of cotton receive a higher price in the 
presence of direct government interventions than they would 
have in the absence of these interventions. The extent of 
protection ranges from 25% in 1984 to 220% in 1986 . In 1985, 
the NRPD for cotton is negative and implies that the cotton is 
taxed by about 7%. The adjusted direct NRP for cotton gives 
the same picture of positive protection for cotton (except for 
1985) i.e., that cotton receives a subsidy. 
NRPD estimates for groundnuts are negative for most years 
except for 1987 and 1988 where they are positive. This 
implies that groundnuts is taxed, with the tax ranging between 
3% and 44% . The positive NRPD estimates for groundnuts in 
1987 and 1988 imply that groundnuts received a subsidy during 
these two years . 
The NRPD estimates for wheat are also negative for most 
years (except for 1982, 1985 and 1986). This implies wheat 
has been taxed during this period. Taxation ranged between 6% 
in 1981 and 37% in 1987. The years where NRPD for wheat are 
positive imply that wheat was protected during these years. 
The NRPI estimates for cotton are negative for most years 
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with the exception of the years 1981 and 1982 . The NRPI 
estimates capture the effects of indirect government policies 
such as exchange rate and trade policies on producer prices. 
The negative estimates imply that cotton, an agricultural 
export, is taxed via indirect interventions. This taxation 
ranges from 2% in 1986 to 26% in 1988. The NRPI estimates for 
groundnuts are surprising. There are years when the estimates 
are positive i.e., indirect government policies had positive 
effects on the prices of groundnuts. The NRPI estimates for 
wheat are negative for most years. 
The NRPT estimates give the effect of both direct and 
indirect interventions. This is positive for cotton for all 
years except 1984, 1985 and 1988. This implies that the 
direct government interventions offset the negative effect of 
the indirect government policies. The NRPT estimates for 
groundnuts and wheat are negative for most years which implies 
that the overall effect of both the direct and indirect 
government policies have resulted in the taxation of 
groundnuts and wheat. 
Given that the government taxes agricultural commodities 
heavily, in particular cotton, these are surprising results. 
The main source of the problem may be the fact that the prices 
in the Gezira Scheme are government determined . Due to lack 
of information, the procedure by which the prices are 
determined by the government is not available. Prices do not 
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represent opportunity cost and do not convey market 
information. Thus, the NRP calculations are not able to 
capture the level of protection or taxation . In addition to 
this, world prices were obtained by dividing the total value 
of exports by the total quantity exported. However, due to 
lack of information, it is not clear at what stage these 
values are reported by the Bank of Sudan and thus whether 
these prices represent f .o.b prices for these commodities. 
Effective Rate of Protection {ERP) 
ERP captures the combined effects of government 
interventions on the prices of crops and agricultural inputs . 
ERP is a measure of protection afforded to an activity not a 
commodity. 
ERP is the ratio of value added at domestic prices to 
value added at world prices expressed as a percentage of value 
added at world prices (Dethier, 1988). 
Direct Effective Rate of Protection {ERPD) 
where 
VAd: the value added of agricultural product at domestic 
prices of tractable outputs and inputs 
V~: the value added of agricultural products at border 
prices of tradable outputs and inputs evaluated at Eo 
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PNA: the n onagricultural price index 
Indirect Effective Rate of Protection (ERPI ) 
Indirect effective rate of protection ERPI = ERPT - ERPD 
It is important to note that, in the study of Egypt by Dethier 
(1988 ) , in the equation for ERPD and ERPT, the value added for 
each crop was divided by an index of val ue added in 
nonagriculture (VANA) in order to obta i n an effective 
protection rate in relative terms. The indices of value added 
in nonagricultural sectors are based on the implicit Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP ) deflater data ( i . e. , the ratio o f 
sectoral GDP at current prices to GDP at constant pri ces ) 
(Dethier, 1988 ) . However, due to the lack of adequate data, 
PNA and PNA. have been used in place of VANA and VANA. 
following the example of Zambia (Jansen, 1988 ) A r ough 
estimate of VANA and VANA. showed that t he use of PNA d oes not 
alter the results significantly . 
where 
VANA · =a(E . / E
0
) VANA(T) +(l-a)VANA (NT) 
l+tm 
VANA·: the corrected nonagricultural value added index 
VANA (T) : tradable component of nonagricultural value added 
index 
VANA (NT ) the nontradable component o f nonagricultural value 
added index 
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Total Effective Rate of Protection (ERPT) 
In the case of total intervention 
where 
ERPT: the total effective rate of protection 
V~: the value added of agricultural products at domestic 
prices of tradable outputs and inputs 
VAt,: the value added of agricultural products at border 
prices evaluated at official exchange rates for each 
crop 
PNA: the nonagricultural price index 
PNA· : the corrected nonagricultural price index 
E· : the equilibrium nominal exchange rate 
E3 : the official exchange rate that applies to each crop (Ee, 
Eg, E0 for cotton , groundnuts and wheat respectively) 
The data used to calculate NRP and ERP (direct, indirect 
and total) has been explained in previous sections. Table 
4.23 shows ERPD and ERPT for cotton, groundnuts and wheat 
respectively for the period 1980 to 1988. 
The ERP estimates for the three agricultural commodities 
under study follow the same direction as the NRP estimates. 
The ERPD estimates for cotton are positive for all years 
except for 1985, 1986 and 1987. This implies that cotton was 
97 
protected during this period with protec tion ranging from 10% 
to 438%. The ERPD estimates for groundnuts indicate that 
groundnuts have been taxed for most years except for the last 
t wo years. As in the NRPD estimates for groundnuts, the last 
two years show l arge positive values which imply subsidization 
of groundnuts in 1987 and 1988. The ERPD estimates of wheat 
show taxation of this commodity during the entire period of 
study. The level of taxation varied from 7% to 316%. 
Table 4.23: ERP estimates for cotton, groundnuts and wheat 
Year Cotton Groundnuts Wheat 
ERPD ERPT ERPD ERPT ERPD ERPT 
1980 2.121 1. 385 - 0.482 -0.462 -0 . 515 -0 . 518 
1981 4.384 5.652 -0.385 -0.240 -3 . 163 -3 .019 
1982 1.736 2.134 -0.038 0.101 -0.177 -0.261 
1983 0.350 0.205 -0.397 - 0.461 -0.453 -0 .438 
1984 0.578 0.229 -0 .408 -0.256 -0.299 -0.215 
1985 -0.099 -0.307 -0 .436 -0.566 -0. 174 -0 .255 
1986 -2.336 -2.306 -0 .148 -0.249 -0.068 -0.0 53 
1987 -13.795 -11.596 1 .0 05 1.095 -0.503 -0.615 
1988 0.690 0 . 249 2.893 1.879 -0.331 -0 .666 
The ERPT estimates of cotton show positive protection 
while the ERPT estimates for groundnuts and wheat show 
negative protection i.e., taxation of these two commodities. 
As with the NRP estimates, the problem lies in the fact that 
the prices of these agricultural commodities are fixed and 
therefore do not represent opportunity cost. Furthermore, the 
inability of tenants in the Gezira Scheme make production 
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decisions in terms of choosing inputs and minimizing costs due 
to the control imposed by the SGB and the government has also 
affected the calculations of ERP . 
Due the unavailability off .o.b. prices for Sudan and the 
unanticipated results obtained especially in the case of 
cotton , the nominal and effective rates of protection for 
cotton were also calculated using prices for U.S . Middeling M-
1-3/32 inch cotton c . i.f. Northern Europe obtained from the 
Cotton Outlook and Situation Report. Transportation and 
freight costs were deducted from the c.i.f. prices for cotton 
to get f .o .b. prices at Port Sudan. Table 4.24 shows the 
c . i.f. Northern Europe price for U.S. cotton expressed in 
cents per pound and the f .o.b. price of cotton expressed in 
LS / ton. 
Table 4.24. Price per pound of U.S. Middeling M-1-3 /32" c.i.f. 
Year 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
Northern Europe and f . o.b. cot ton price Port Sudan 
c . i. f . price 
cent/lb 
93.63 
83.53 
72.57 
84 . 08 
80.91 
59.91 
47.91 
74.78 
63.86 
ci . f. price 
$/ton 
2065.27 
1841.50 
1599.88 
1853.63 
1783.80 
1320 . 79 
1056 . 30 
1648.56 
1407.91 
f . o .b price Port Sudan 
$/ton LS/ton 
1838 . 09 
1638.94 
1423.89 
1649 . 73 
1587 . 58 
1175.50 
940.11 
1467.22 
1253 . 04 
919 . 05 
1475.04 
1851.06 
2309.62 
2063.85 
2938.77 
3055.34 
4768.47 
5638.69 
1 Source: Cotton Situation and Outlook Report 
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Table 4.25 . NRP and ERP estimates for cotton using Northern 
Europe c.i.f. price for U.S. cotton 
Year NRPD NRPd NRPI NRPT ERPD ERPT 
1980 1 . 101 0 . 824 -0.236 0.605 2 . 657 1.795 
1981 0.298 0.337 0.236 0.604 0 . 595 0.970 
1982 0 .228 0.246 0. 145 0.407 0.342 0.537 
1983 -0 .039 -0.040 -0 .107 -0. 142 -0.089 -0.186 
1984 0.337 0 . 218 -0.222 0.041 0.850 0.440 
1985 0 .183 0 .090 -0 .231 -0.090 0 .314 0 . 011 
1986 1. 030 0.994 -0 . 023 0.984 -4.830 -4 . 743 
1987 0 .501 0.418 -0.172 0 .243 1.044 0.692 
1988 0 . 423 0.311 -0.261 0.052 1.299 0.700 
Table 4 .25 gives the NRP and ERP estimates for cotton 
using the Northern Europe c.i .f. price for U. S. cotton. The 
estimates do not change much with the prices used. The NRPD 
and NRPd estimates still indicate that cotton is protected. 
The NRPI indicate that the indirect intervention in the form 
of exchange rate overvaluation and trade policy result in the 
taxation of cotton (except for 1981 and 1 982). The NRPT 
indicates the protection of cotton for most of the period 
under study . The same conclusions are obtained from the ERPD 
and ERPT estimates of cotton . As discussed earlier, the 
prices of cotton fixed by the government do not reflect 
opportunity cost and the control of input and land allocation 
by the government parastatals has greatly affected the results 
obtained from the calculation of the rates of protection of 
not only cotton but also of groundnuts and wheat. 
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CHAPTER S. DI SCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Discussion 
Introduction 
The Sudan h a s e xperienced severe economic problems 
including increasing negative trade balances and external debt 
service obligations. Since over 90% of the Sudan's export 
earnings comes from agriculture, economic recovery has always 
been linked to agricultural recovery and improved export 
performance. In addition to providing most of the food 
supply, the agricultural sector is also a source of raw 
materials for the nonagricultural industries in the country 
{D'Silva and El Badawi, 1987). Thus , t he agr icultural sector 
is an important contributor, not only to foreign exchange 
earnings but also to food security. For these reasons, it is 
considered the driving force behind the country's economic 
prosperity (Ibrahim, 1989) . Government intervention policies 
have been considered to be extremely hindering to the growth 
of agriculture in particular and to the economic growth of the 
country as a whole. Thus the study of the effect of the 
country's agricultural and economic policies is crucial. 
Analysis of Some Government Policies 
The agricul t ural sector has thus been e x posed to several 
restricting policies as is apparent from the government 
policies indicated in Chapter 3 . The imposition of taxes in 
the form of export, import, development and local taxes have 
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affected the agricultural sector severely. These taxes have 
had a significant effect on producers' revenues and 
i ncentives. As a result of these taxes and low productivity, 
the competitiveness of Sudan ' s agricultural products in the 
world market is low {Abdel Salam, 1986 ). 
As we have seen , the modern sector receives the most in 
terms of s ubsidies whil e the traditional sector is virtually 
neglected. This seems to indicate that the beneficiaries of 
these subsidies are the powerful interest groups in the 
country. Policies , aimed at keeping prices of food low for 
the urban sector, put poor farmers in the traditional sector 
at a disadvantage . The traditional sector consists of the 
majority of the farming population and also , has the highest 
potential for contributing to the country's economy. However, 
l ack of investments in this sect or has resulted in low 
production and hence, lower income s for the traditional 
c ult ivators. 
Trade restrictions have resulted in smuggling and the 
emergence of black markets for exchange rates {Abdel Salam, 
1986) . Price regulation policies and the setting of floor 
prices have caused adverse effect s on producers. Announced 
floor prices do not change to reflect c hanges in international 
prices and these prices are set t oo low to be effective. 
The existence of multiple exchange rates also poses a 
problem. Al though the g overnment adopted a policy of a series 
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of devaluations, it still maintained different exchange rates, 
namely, exchange rates for agricultural inputs, cotton and gum 
arabic, other exports and remittances for Sudanese nationals 
working abroad (El Badawi, 1989). These exchange rates result 
in different incentives not only for crop producers but also 
across subsectors. The existence of black market exchange 
rates that are much higher than the official exchange rates 
indicates that the exchange rates are overvalued. 
Fixed cropping patterns imposed in the irrigated 
subsector have inhibited producers from making decisions. 
Fixed resource allocations are not influenced by prices. 
These act as disincentives to producers. Furthermore, 
devaluations result in output price incentives to producers 
but also in increased costs of imported inputs. The producers 
in the Gezira Scheme have no power to respond to these price 
signals by changing the intensity of input use or by 
reallocating crops. This has resulted in inefficient 
allocation of resources in the Scheme. Studies done on Sudan 
have concluded that in order to improve producer incentives , 
certain policy changes have to take place, especially in terms 
of exchange rate flexibility and the extent of government 
involvement in the production process. It is argued that the 
irrigated subsector parastatals are a liability to the 
government's treasury rather than a source of income (D'Silva, 
1985) . 
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Thus despite the substantial contribution of the 
agricultural sector to the GDP and foreign exchange earnings, 
its share is declining (D 'Silva, 1985 and El Badawi, 1987 ) 
El Badawi argued that "the biased relative structure of 
incentives in the economy" is the main cause behind this 
phenomenon. It has also been argued that overvalued exchange 
rates, inflationary internal balances and protectionism 
distorted the structure of incentives in the Sudan in favor of 
home goods and import-competing sectors and against 
exportables (El Badawi, 1987). To finance the expanding 
fiscal deficit, the government relied on agriculture as a 
major tax base. Direct intervention in agriculture which 
included the underpricing of exports, forced procurement, and 
restrictive foreign trade and payment regime, has resulted in 
weakening the backbone of the Sudanese economy . In addition 
to the adverse policies, shortages in inputs, inefficiency and 
bureaucracy, high costs in marketing, distribution, 
transportation and storage have contributed to the failing of 
the agricultural sector. The absence of marketing and c redit 
system in the traditional sector has resulted in the low 
prices facing producers in that sector . 
Policy reforms, initiated in 1979, included exchange rate 
changes, increases in producer prices o f cotton, groundnuts, 
sesame and gum arabic, reduction of subsidies on bread, sugar 
and petroleum products and change in production relations in 
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the irrigated sector. It is thus evident that the Sudanese 
government recognizes the need for changes in its policies 
concerning agriculture and the economy in general. Sudan's 
policy makers face the tax of increasing agricultural 
production, achieving food self-sufficiency, increasing 
exports, decreasing debt servicing and increasing government 
revenues. Among these changes are unification of exchange 
rates , institutional changes in the irrigated subsector, 
reducing operating cost and budgetary subsidies for 
agricultural parastatals and encouraging private sector 
involvement in the agricultural sector. 
Results 
Estimates of the direct nominal rate of protection (NRPD) 
for cotton are positive for all years except for 1985. This 
implies that cotton has been protected during this period. 
These results are somewhat surprising. Both El Badawi (1989 ) 
and Dethier (1988) have calculated negative NRPD for cotton. 
This unexpected result may be due to a number of reasons. The 
main and most important reason may be that the prices of 
cotton are government determined and it is not evident how 
these prices are determined. A second reason may be due to 
the fact that the study concentrated only on the Gezira 
Scheme, a government operated project where policies directed 
specifically toward the scheme may be favorable especially in 
the case of cotton, the major crop. However, the Gezira 
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Scheme does produce a large proportion of the cotton crop and 
it is evident that any policy directed toward cotton would 
have an effect on cotton production as a whole . The third 
reason is the extremely poor and unreliable data that has been 
used. Estimates are not accurate due to the manipulation that 
had to be performed on the data. For example, the cost data 
used is the cost structure for one year deflated using CPI to 
obtain costs for the remaining years. 
Direct nominal rate of protection estimates for 
groundnuts and wheat are negative for mos t years except for 
1987 and 1988 for groundnuts and 1982, 1985 and 1986 for 
wheat. The results however show a general trend of taxation 
in the case of these two commodities. This result is 
consistent with El Badawi's results for groundnuts (El Badawi 
1989) . Negative NRP estimates imply that the producers o f 
these commodities receive a lower domestic price than what 
would have prevailed in the absence o f interventions. 
The indirect nominal rates of protection (NRPI ) for the 
crops under study are negative for most years (except for 
groundnuts ) thus indicating that the economy-wide policies 
have taxed these agricultural commodities. The total nominal 
rates of protection indicate the total effect of intervention 
and these are positive for cot ton and negative for groundnuts 
and wheat for most of the years under study . 
The effective rates of protection for all three crops 
106 
seem to move in the same direction as the NRP results. 
According to both the direct and total estimates (ERPD and 
ERPT respectively) cotton has been protected and groundnuts 
and whea t have been taxed for the period 1980 - 1988. 
The NRP and ERP estimates seem to imply the same result 
i.e . , direct policies have protected cotton and taxed 
groundnuts and wheat while the macroeconomic policies have 
taxed cotton, groundnuts and wheat . However, as mentioned 
earlier, the calculation of the NRP and ERP estimates is 
affected by the fact that government determined prices do not 
convey demand and production information and that prices do 
not influence the resource allocations and cropping patterns 
in the Gezira Scheme since they are fixed by the government. 
A more appropriate method of calculating the rates of 
protection for these commodities is to use shadow prices which 
reflect opportunity cost. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Aside from the unexpected and unreliable result in terms 
of cotton, it is s afe to deduce that agricultural commodities 
are being taxed both directly and indirectly in the Sudan. 
Although inappropriate agricultural and macroeconomic policies 
have contributed to this factor, there are other issues to 
consider. 
Developmental efforts have been concentrated in the 
irrigated and rainfed mechanized subsectors (the modern 
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sector) . The lack of development programs in the rainfed 
traditional sector have hindered the development of this 
sector which as seen above is a crucial part of the Sudanese 
economy. According to D'Silva (1985) , the rainfed sector has 
a very high potential for growth. Appropriate government 
policies, in terms of investments and availability of inputs 
should be directed to traditional agriculture so as to 
increase revenue and productivity in that sector . It is now 
evident that concentration of investment in the modern sector 
has not reaped the desired results and has been at the expense 
of the potentially productive traditional sector . The heavy 
reliance on imported goods by the modern sector has taken its 
toll on the Sudanese economy. 
The government should also aim at increasing producer 
incentives by letting producer prices move with exchange rate 
adjustments and adjusting prices toward border price 
equivalents as well as increasing the efficiency in the 
management of government operated agricultural schemes and 
including producers in the decision process. D ' Silva and 
McKaig (1986 ) also suggest changes in the cropping patterns by 
reducing the areas allocated to cotton production and 
increasing the areas for wheat and/or sorghum production. 
This does not only increase food production and thus reduce 
food imports but also provides savings in terms of water 
requirements. This increase in water availability could mean 
108 
increased food production in the other schemes (D'Silva and 
McKaig, 1986). This still implies planned production rather 
than free market. Although restrictive government policies 
have hindered productivity in the agricultural schemes, 
reduction of the areas allocated to cotton production would 
serve as a better policy if the government continues to 
exercise control . 
The weather conditions and the political instability 
cannot be ignored as contributing factors to the country 's 
growing problems. However, it is the inadequate government 
policies that are the main culprit. In order to induce 
positive change , the government should implement exchange 
rate, trade and pricing policies that will improve the 
incentive structure of producers. Although development 
programs should continue to focus on agriculture as the main 
engine of growth, especially with respect to exports, it is 
questionable whether concentration on only cotton as the major 
export crop is wise . Sudan has suffered from lower cotton 
production and has had problems with marketing the crop 
internationally (D 'Silva and McKaig, 1986). Sudan has a 
comparative advantage in many of the agricultural commodities 
it produces with rainfed crops offering the highest potential 
(Moe and Haddad, 1983). It is therefore a better strategy to 
promote a number of agricultural commodities for export 
instead of relying on one major foreign exchange earner . 
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APPENDIX A. GEZIRA SCHEME STATISTICS 
Table A.l. Production of cotton, groundnuts, wheat and s orghum 
Season ELS Cotton1 MS Cotton1 Groundnuts2 Wheat2 Sorghum2 
78/79 1,169,791 460,524 189,383 123,758 146,917 
79/80 1,094 , 169 345,182 132,556 170,579 163,647 
80 / 81 914,497 242,490 83,750 75,997 69,191 
81 / 82 1,539,286 151,056 97,771 87 ,483 89,414 
82 / 83 1,629,807 645,977 60,755 92 ,969 125,167 
83/84 1,480,536 972,972 91,529 103,100 216,167 
84/85 1,516,637 910,365 108,558 oJ 147 ,024 
85/86 1,286 , 477 132,685 55,882 97,387 318,315 
86/87 1,554,272 493,904 91,083 95,908 179 ,2 02 
87/88 921,721 830,384 95,897 119,568 141,287 
1. Production in kantars. 
2. Production in metric tons. 
3. No wheat production in Gezira during the 1984 / 85 season. 
Source: Sudan Gezira Board, 1989. 
Table A.2 . Areas under production for cotton, groundnuts, 
wheat and sorghum (in feddans ) 
Season ELS Cotton MS Cotton 
78/79 
79/80 
80 / 81 
81 / 82 
82 / 83 
83 / 84 
84/85 
85/86 
86/87 
87 / 88 
409,127 
446,588 
426,925 
379,889 
375,360 
346,609 
345,298 
376,139 
328,435 
237,992 
88,897 
94,302 
74,277 
55,425 
108,256 
151,120 
119,495 
24,419 
86,639 
145,045 
Groundnuts 
217,182 
228,545 
170,919 
264,245 
148,182 
136,611 
212,859 
102,535 
151,050 
158,728 
Wheat 
493,436 
362,502 
366,737 
267,863 
155,76 0 
265,865 
oi 
242,498 
1 79 ,869 
252,314 
Sorghum 
344,068 
327,294 
300,832 
343,899 
320,940 
410,791 
420,068 
578,754 
448,005 
394,457 
1 . No wheat production in Gezira during the 1984 / 85 season. 
Source: Sudan Gezira Board, 1989. 
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Table A .3. Yields of cotton, groundnuts, wheat and sorghum 
Season ELS Cotton1 MS Cotton1 Groundnuts2 Wheat2 Sorghum2 
78/79 2 .859 5.180 0.872 0.251 0.427 
79/80 2.450 3.660 0.580 0 . 471 0.500 
80/81 5 .333 3.265 0.490 0 . 207 0.230 
81/82 4.052 2.725 0.370 0.327 0.260 
82/83 4.342 5.929 0.410 0.597 0.390 
83/84 4 . 271 6.438 0.670 0 . 388 0 .5 26 
84/85 4.392 7.618 0.510 o . 0003 0.350 
85/86 3.420 5.434 0.545 0.402 0.550 
86/87 4.732 5.701 0.603 0 .533 0.400 
87/88 3.873 5.725 0 .6 04 0.474 0 . 358 
1. Yields in kantar/feddan. 
2 . Yields in ton/feddan. 
3. No wheat production in Gezira during the 1984/85 season. 
Source: Sudan Gezira Board, 1989. 
Table A .4 . Picking labor statistics 
Season Tenants Local Imported Floating Total Total 
& Their Labor Labor Labor Available Required 
Families 
78/79 132,703 69 ,11 6 252,877 7,877 462,573 460,296 
79/80 138,316 75,829 217,138 5,460 436,743 460,596 
80/81 131,627 77,473 186,018 5,161 400,279 410,513 
81/82 124,978 77,399 161,761 3,518 367,656 394,202 
82/83 145,719 86,380 203,659 3,209 438,967 466,185 
83/84 141,940 90,850 231,933 5,697 470,42 0 493,054 
84/85 141,505 94,078 214,862 13,640 464,085 470,830 
85/86 132,421 87,584 173,024 11,505 404,534 405 , 790 
86/87 127,284 99,326 163,358 8,495 398,463 406,953 
87/88 124,399 89,874 144, 526 7 ,517 366 , 316 383 , 015 
Source: Sudan Gezira Board, 1989. 
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Table A.5. Land a nd water charges (LS/f eddan) 
Season Cotton Wheat Groundnuts Sorghum Vegetables 
81/82 28.50 18.00 14.00 7.00 25.00 
82/83 28.50 18.00 14.00 7.00 25.00 
83/84 38.00 23.00 19.00 19.00 33 .25 
84/85 50.00 31.00 25.00 25.00 44.00 
85/86 65.00 40.00 32.00 32.00 57.00 
86/87 80.00 4 9.00 40.00 4 0 . 00 70 . 00 
87/88 101.00 60.00 50 . 00 50 . 00 96.00 
Source: Sudan Gezira Board, 1989. 
Table A.6. Total cost and gross revenues (LS/feddan) 
Season 
78/79 
79/80 
80/81 
8 1 / 82 
82/83 
83/84 
84/85 
85/86 
86/87 
87/88 
Cotton 
Cost Revenue 
64.727 
80.972 
107.864 
233 . 886 
293 . 948 
42 6.200 
443.62 0 
170.730 
1 39.600 
1 56.000 
385.800 
401.76 0 
548.800 
701 . 720 
777.590 777.580 
834.930 1210.630 
1035.850 1403.860 
Groundnut 
Cost Revenue 
26.000 
38.000 
46.910 
73.770 
90 . 513 
135 . 114 
132.830 
200.960 
262.660 
379 . 480 
52.000 
90.000 
139 . 220 
75.030 
159.020 
350.410 
270.720 
615.760 
592.770 
669 . 460 
Whea t 
Cost Revenue 
22.000 
65.000 
4 0 .8 00 
93.413 
124.278 
14 0.804 
o. 000 1 
273.210 
275.78 0 
320.909 
21.000 
51.000 
44.255 
67 . 100 
194 . 000 
150.800 
o. 000 1 
303 . 340 
409.710 
518.370 
1. No wheat production in the Gezira during the 1984/85 
season. 
Source: Sudan Ge z ira Board, 1989. 
117 
APPENDIX B. PRICE STRUCTURES 
Table B.l. Price structure for export of long staple cotton 
lint in 1982 constant prices 
International: US$ / MT 1982 
Price c.i.f North Europe 1 
International Freight 
Price f .o.b. Port Sudan 
Port Sudan: LS/ MT 
Price f .o . b . Port Sudan 
Development tax (5% of f . o . b. ) 
Export company commission (1% o f f .o.b. ) 
Shipping expenses (LS 0 . 50 / Kantar ) 
Quay dues (0.5% of f.o.b. ) 
Price ex - store, Port Sudan 
CPC commission (2% of ex-store) 
Insurance and claims (1 . 25% of ex-store ) 
Equalization fund (2% of ex - store) 
Financial 
1675 
176 
1499 
1350 
68 
14 
11 
7 
1250 
25 
16 
25 
Price stabilization fund (0.5% of ex - store) 
CPC unforeseen expenses (2% of ex-store) 
Selling price, Port Sudan 
6 
25 
1153 
Bank interest (9% per annum for 12 months) 
Price to parastatal 
Transport and handling 
Ex - ginnery price 
Ex-Ginning: LS / MT 
Return from lint (34% ) 
Re t urn from seed (61% ) 
Collection Center to Ex-Ginnery: 
Ginning, baling and storage 
Transport and handling 
Farmgate to Collection Center: 
Transport 
Farmgate price (LS/ MT) 
(LS/Kantar ) 
104 
1049 
39 
1 010 
343 
131 
40 
6 
3 
425 
61 
Economic 
1675 
176 
1499 
13 50 
8 
7 
4 
1331 
15 
14 
15 
1287 
90 
1197 
33 
1164 
396 
106 
2 5 
4 
2 
471 
67 
1 . 1982 price based on market quotation (May 1982 ) f o r GSB, 
Apri l 8, 1982. 
Source: World Bank Export Development Study, 1983. 
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Table B.2. Price structure for export of medium staple cotton 
lint in 1982 constant prices 
International: US$/MT 1982 
Price c.i.f. North Europe1 
Price f .o.b. Port Sudan 
Port Sudan: LS/MT 
Price f .o.b. Port Sudan 
Development tax (5% of f.o .b.) 
Export company commission (1% of f.o.b. ) 
Shipping expenses (LS 0.50/Kantar) 
Quay dues (0. 5% of f.o.b.) 
Price ex-store, Port Sudan 
CPC commission (2% of ex-store) 
Insurance and claims (1 . 25% of ex -store) 
Equalization fund (2% of ex-store) 
Financial 
1668 
1335 
1202 
60 
12 
12 
6 
1112 
22 
14 
22 
Price Stabilization fund (0.5% of ex-store) 
CPC unforeseen expenses (2% of ex-store ) 
Selling price, Port Sudan 
6 
22 
1026 
Bank interest (9% per annum for 12 months) 
Price to parastatal 
Transport and handling 
Ex-ginnery price 
Ex-Ginning: LS / MT 
Return from lint (38%) 
Return from seed (58%) 
Collection Center to Ex-Ginnery 
Ginning, baling and storage 
Transport and handling 
Farmgate to Collection Center: 
Transport 
Farmgate price (LS/MT) 
(LS / Kantar ) 
92 
934 
39 
895 
340 
82 
48 
6 
3 
365 
52 
1 . 1982 price based on market quotatio n (May 1982) for 
Mexican, Middeling 35 (1-3 /32 "). 
Source: World Bank Export Development Study, 1983. 
Economic 
1688 
1335 
1202 
7 
7 
4 
1184 
13 
8 
13 
1150 
55 
1095 
33 
1062 
404 
64 
29 
4 
2 
433 
62 
119 
Table B.3. Price structure for export o f groundnut in 1982 
constant prices 
International: US/Ton 
Price c.i.f. Europe (shelled ) 
Price f .o.b. Port Sudan' 
Port Sudan: LS/Ton 
Price f .o.b. Port Sudan 
Company profit (5% of f.o.b.) 
Impurities (2% of f .o.b.) 
Agent commission (1% of f.o.b.) 
Delay charges (1% of f.o.b.) 
Insurance (0 . 01% of f.o.b.) 
Free fatty acid content (1% of f .o.b . ) 
Oil deficit (1% of f.o.b.) 
Price at dock 
Stabilization fee 
Port Sudan expenses 
Storage (LS 0.6 for 4 months) 
Price at company store 
Bank interest (11% per annum for 4 months ) 
Local deale r price, Port Sudan 
Auction Market to Port Sudan: LS/Ton 
Local dealer profit (5%) 
Loading/ off-loading 
Transport 
Price at local dealer store 
Bank interest (14% per annum for 4 months) 
Local tax (LS 0.5/Kantar) 2 
Decortication 
Sacks 
Local tax paid by dealer (15%) 3 
Auction market price 
Auction market price, in shell (LS /Ton) 4 
Auction market price, in shell (LS/Kantar) 
Farmgate prices as % of border prices 
Financial 
410 
513 
461 
23 
9 
5 
5 
5 
5 
409 
1 
14 
3 
391 
14 
377 
19 
3 
25 
330 
15 
11 
9 
9 
43 
243 
158 
7.2 
53 
Economic 
410 
513 
461 
14 
5 
3 
3 
3 
3 
430 
8 
2 
42 0 
8 
412 
11 
2 
25 
374 
9 
5 
5 
355 
231 
10.5 
77 
1. 25% historical price differential over international 
reference price . 
2. 1 kantar = 100 lb = 45 kg; 22 kantars in one metri c ton. 
3. To Central Government. 
4. 65% recovery rate. 
Source: World Bank Export Development Study, 1983. 
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Table B.4. Price structure for wheat import, 1982 
International: US$ / Ton 
Price f.o .b . NA 
International Freight 
Price c.i . f. Port Sudan 
Port Sudan: LS/Ton 
Price c . i . f . Port Sudan 
Defense tax (10% of c.i.f. } 
Port handling 
Bagging and storage 
Commission (2% of c.i.f . ) 
Price ex- store Port Sudan 
Port Sudan to Mill : 
Transportation 
Sacks 
Price at mill 1 
Local transport 
Farmgate price (LS/Ton) 
(LS /Sack) 
Financial 
166 
40 
206 
185 
19 
8 
4 
4 
220 
30 
4 
254 
3 
257 
23 
1. Official price paid to farmers: LS 230/ton. 
Source: World Bank Export Development Study, 1983. 
Economic 
166 
40 
206 
185 
5 
2 
2 
194 
60 
2 
256 
3 
259 
23 
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Table B. 5. Price structure for export of cotton seed , 1982 
International: US$ / MT 
Cotton oil, c . i.f. Rotterdam1 
Cotton pellet , c.i.f. Denmark1 
Seed value of oil : 610 x .16 = 
Seed value of cake: 187 x .78 
Crushing margin (5%) 
Seed price , c.i.f. North Europe 
International f reight2 
Price f .o.b. Port Sudan 
Port Sudan: LS/MT 
Price f .o . b. Port Sudan 
Export tax (15% of f .o . b. ) 
Development tax (5% off .o .b. ) 
Port Sudan costs 
Bank charges (1% off .o.b.) 
Selling price, Port Sudan 
Ginnery to Port: LS / MT 
Transport and handling 
Sacks 
Ex-ginnery price3 
1. Market Quotations, May 1982 . 
2. Same as for groundnuts. 
Financial 
610 
187 
98 
146 
12 
256 
44 
212 
191 
29 
10 
5 
2 
145 
15 
9 
121 
3. White cotton seed valued at 2 /3 of this price. 
Source : World Bank Export Development Study, 1983 . 
Economic 
191 
3 
1 
187 
9 
5 
173 
122 
Table B.6. Price structure for urea i mport (fertilizer) , 1982 
International: US$ / Ton 
Price f . o.b. N.W. Europe, bagged1 
International Freight 
Price c.i.f . Port Sudan 
Port Sudan: LS / Ton 
Price c .i .f. Port Sudan 
Import duty (5% of c.i .f. ) 
Port handling 
Port Sudan to Farmgate: 
Transportation 
On-site price 
Price per sac k (LS /50 Kg ) 
Financial 
160 
45 
205 
185 
9 
6 
30 
230 
10 
Source: World Bank Export Development S tudy, 1983. 
Economic 
160 
4 5 
205 
185 
4 
60 
249 
12 
123 
APPENDIX C. COST OF PRODUCTION DATA 
Table C.l. Cotton: Cost o f production data and value added at 
domestic prices 
Season 79 / 80 80 / 81 81 / 82 82 / 83 83 / 84 84 / 8S 8S / 86 86 / 87 8 7/88 
Farmgate Prices 
Long Staple (LS) Cotton 
LS / Kantar 70 . S0 1 70.SO 86 . 00 88 . 00 107 .00 13S.OO 21S.OO 248.00 2 93 . 00 
LS / Ton 492.32 492.3 2 600 . S6 614.S3 747 . 21 942 . 74 lSOl.40 1731.84 2046. 0 9 
Medium Staple (MS) Cotton 
LS / Kantar SO.S0 1 SO.SO 66.00 68.00 82 . 00 106.00 200 . 00 218.00 243 . 00 
LS / Ton 3S2 . 65 352.6S 460.89 474.86 572.63 740 .22 1396 . 65 1522. 35 1696 . 93 
Weighted Average 
LS / Kantar 67.54 
LS/Ton 471.65 
Tradable Inputs4 
67.54 83 . 46 
471 . 65 S82.82 
(LS / Feddan) 
3 . 98 4.63 
12 . 04 8.33 
83.50 99 . 40 127 . 55 214. 09 241.73 274.05 
583.10 694.13 890 . 71 1495 . 04 1688 . 06 1913 . 76 
Seeds 2 . 09 
LS / Ton 5 . 49 
3.67 
5.45 
6 . 01 
8 . 51 
6.87 
9 . 19 
9 . 58 
18 . 88 
12 . 65 
17 . 90 
15.S7 
23.76 
Fertilizer 12 . 53 21 . 07 40 . 34 42 . 70 41.61 40 . 42 114.7S 76.61 79 . 33 
LS / Ton 32.87 63 . 74 72 . S5 63.45 58 . 95 54.06 226 . 17 108 . 42 121 . 11 
Herbicides 0.00 
LS / Ton 0.00 
0.00 6 . 15 13.00 26 . 21 28.60 
0.00 11 . 06 19.33 37.13 38.25 
38.2S 
75.39 
37.82 
53.52 
54 . 02 
82.4 7 
Insect. 2 
LS/ Ton 
27 . 52 33.63 60 . 75 69.51 112 . 85 101.29 259.00 248.71 281.94 
72 . 22 101.75 109 . 25 103.30 159.87 135 . 46 510. 49 351 . 97 430 . 43 
Empty Sacks 1 . 32 
LS / Ton 3 . 4 5 
2 . 55 
7 . 72 
5 . 26 7.57 14.59 22.26 
9.46 11 . 26 20 . 66 29.77 
Machinery 5 . 29 9.13 12.97 17.77 27.61 30 . 49 
LS / Ton 13.88 27 . 62 23.32 26 . 41 39.12 40.78 
Total 48 . 74 70.37 130 . 10 154.22 228.88 229.93 
LS / Ton 127.90 212.87 233.97 229 . 19 324 . 24 3 07 . 50 
Value Added for Cotton3 
LS Cotton 364.41 279.44 366 . 59 385 . 34 422 . 96 635.24 
MS Cotton 224 . 75 139.78 2 26.92 245 . 67 248.38 432 . 73 
Average 343 . 74 258 . 77 348.85 353.91 369 . 89 583.22 
1. 1980/81 farmgate price. 
2. Insecticide and Application. 
14 . 64 
28 . 86 
42.72 
84 . 20 
21 . 11 
29.8 7 
28 . 81 
43.99 
54 . 99 82 . 42 
77 . 22 125.82 
478.94 451. 89 542.09 
944.00 639 . 51 827.57 
557 . 40 1092.33 1218 . 52 
452.65 882.84 869 . 35 
551.04 1048 . 55 1086.18 
3. Computed: Value Added= Farmgate price - Cost of tradable 
inputs . 
Cost in LS/ ton = (Cost in LS/ feddan)/yield. 
4. Source: Sudan Gezira Board, 1989. 
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Table C.2. Groundnuts: Cost of production data and value added 
at domestic prices 
Season 79 / 80 80/81 81 / 82 82 / 8 3 83 / 84 84 / 85 85 / 86 86 / 87 87 / 88 
Farmgate Prices 
LS / Ton 78.00 262.00 1 8 0.00 330.00 420.00 588.00 1120.00 1232.00 1400.00 
Tradable In12uts3 (LS/Feddan ) 
Seeds 3.59 2. 84 7.59 7.42 14. 71 16.19 21.00 29 . 62 43.14 
LS / Ton 6.19 5.80 20.51 18 .1 0 21 . 96 31.75 38.53 49.12 71. 41 
Herbicides 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2. 4 6 0.00 0.00 0 . 00 0.00 
LS / Ton 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3 . 67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Decort. I 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
LS / Ton 0.00 0.55 0 . 00 0.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sacks 2.74 2.62 3.69 2.65 2.65 5.20 30.79 25.80 31.27 
LS / Ton 4.72 5.34 9.97 6 . 46 3.96 10.20 56.49 42.79 51.76 
Machinery 1. 38 1. 39 2.56 3.80 6.51 7. 4 0 5.36 7.01 13. 48 
LS / Ton 2.39 2.84 6.92 9.26 9. 72 14.51 9.83 11. 63 22.31 
Total 
LS / Ton 13.29 14 .53 37. 41 3 4 .51 39.30 56.45 1 04.86 103.53 14 5. 48 
Value Added f o r Groundnuts2 
LS/Ton 64.71 2 4 7 .4 7 142.59 295.49 380.70 531.55 1015.14 1128.47 1254.52 
1. Decortication. 
2. Computed: Valued Added= Farmgate price - Cos t of tradable 
inputs. 
Cost in LS/ ton= (Cos t in LS/feddan)/yield. 
3. Source: Sudan Gezira Board, 1989 . 
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Table C.3. Wheat: Cost of production data and value added at 
domestic prices 
Season 79 / 80 80 / 81 01702 82 / 83 83 / 84 84 / 851 85 / 86 86 / 87 87 / 88 
Farmgate Price 
LS / Ton 118.50 160 .00 230.00 280.00 360.00 700.00 700.00 770.00 1001. 00 
Tradable In.Quts3 (LS/Feddan) 
Fertilizer 12.50 15.07 27.13 28.87 26.59 26.59 81.98 50.18 30.84 
LS / Ton 26.56 72.70 83.07 48.37 68.57 68.57 204.13 94.11 65.08 
Seeds 6.89 8.47 13.00 19 . 99 22.65 22.65 33.50 54. 58 57.75 
LS / Ton 14.64 4 0.85 39.80 33.49 58.40 58.40 83 . 42 102 . 36 121.85 
Sacks 3.44 1. 79 2.46 5. 72 5 . 36 5.36 12.06 11. 20 12.83 
LS/Ton 7.31 8.63 7.53 9.58 13.82 13.82 30.03 21.00 27.08 
Insect. 1. 57 1. 39 2 . 36 6.38 9.93 9.93 19.01 11.52 13.97 
LS / Ton 3.33 6.71 7.23 10.68 25.60 25.60 47.34 21.60 29.48 
Seed Dress. 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 
LS/ Ton 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.33 0.52 0 .52 0.00 0.00 0 . 00 
Machinery 8.90 9.28 13. 40 17.46 20.96 20.96 37.28 42.18 56.23 
LS /Ton 18.91 44.80 41.03 29.25 54.06 54 . 06 92.83 79 .11 118. 66 
Total 
LS / Ton 70.75 173 .68 179.49 131.70 220.97 220 . 97 457.74 318.19 362.16 
Value Added for Wheat2 
LS / Ton 47.75 -13.68 50.51 148.30 139.03 139.03 242.26 451.81 638.84 
1. No Wheat Production during 1984/85 period. Farmgate price 
obtained from Abdelrahman (1990); input data from 1983 /84. 
2. Computed: Value Added= Farmgate price - Cost of tradable 
inputs. 
Cost in LS/ton= (Cost in LS/feddan) / yield. 
3. Source: Sudan Gezira Board, 1989. 
126 
Table C.4. Cost of fertilizer in border prices evaluated at 
the official exchange rate (E0 ) for cotton 
Year 
1980 
1981 
198 2 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
Border Price 
at E0 
132.9910 
161.1195 
272.5335 
288.0600 
291 . 6290 
318 . 1120 
760.0240 
543.4850 
893.5750 
Quantity Area in Cost / Feddan Ton/ Feddan1 Cost 
in Tons 1 Feddans1 {LS / Ton) 
55006 
53379 
47165 
59829 
65019 
60914 
43378 
43595 
46579 
540890 
501202 
435314 
484315 
497729 
464792 
400558 
415074 
383037 
13. 52456 
17.15954 
29.52820 
35.58498 
38.09588 
41.69063 
82.30598 
57.08193 
108.66260 
0.381 
0.331 
0.556 
0.673 
0.706 
0.748 
0.507 
0.707 
0.655 
35.49755 
51.84152 
53.10828 
52.87516 
53.96017 
55.73614 
162.33920 
80.73824 
165 . 89720 
Cost/feddan = (Border price of fertilizerxquantity)/area. 
Cost/ton= (Cost/feddan) / (Ton/feddan) 
l. Source: Sudan Gezira Board, 1989. 
Table C.5. Cost of fertilizer in border prices evaluated at 
the official exchange rate (E0) for wheat 
Year 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
Border Price Quantity Area in 
at E0 in Tons2 Feddans2 
132.9910 
161.1195 
272.5335 
288.0600 
291.6290 
318 .1120 
760.0240 
543.4850 
893 . 5750 
26919 
29354 
18925 
12443 
13291 
I 
18713 
15924 
14952 
362504 
366737 
267863 
155760 
265824 
242498 
179867 
252313 
Cost / Feddan Ton/ Feddan2 Cost 
9.87571 
12.89616 
19.25497 
23 . 01188 
14.58123 
58 . 64926 
48 . 11585 
52.95301 
0.471 
0.207 
0.327 
0.597 
0.388 
0.402 
0 . 533 
0.474 
(LS / Ton) 
20.96753 
62.30032 
58 . 88372 
38.54586 
37.58049 
145.89360 
90.27365 
111. 71520 
Cost/feddan = (Border price of fertilizerxquantity)/area. 
Cost/ton= (Cost/feddan) / (Ton/feddan). 
1. No wheat production in Gezira during the 1985 period. 
2 . Source: Sudan Gezira Board, 1989. 
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Table C.6. Cost of fertilizer in border prices evaluated at 
the equilibrium exchange rate (E. ) for cotton 
Year 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
Border Price 
at E. 
162.3294 
197.8875 
310 . 0785 
333 . 9000 
338. 7379 
365.6540 
951.0740 
686.7171 
1119. 7240 
Quantity Area in Cost/Feddan Ton/ Feddan1 Cost 
in Tons 1 Feddans 1 (LS / Ton) 
55006 
53379 
47165 
59829 
65019 
60914 
43378 
43595 
46579 
540890 
501202 
435314 
484315 
497729 
464792 
400558 
415074 
383037 
16. 50814 
21.07540 
33.59609 
41.24774 
44.24978 
47.92132 
102 . 99550 
72.12552 
136.16340 
0.381 
0 .331 
0. 556 
0.673 
0.706 
0.748 
0.507 
0.707 
0.655 
43.32846 
63. 67192 
60.42463 
61.28937 
62.67674 
64.06594 
203.14700 
102.01630 
207.88300 
Cost/feddan = (Border price of fertilizerxquantity )/area 
Cost/ton= (Cost / feddan )/(Ton/feddan ) 
1. Source: Sudan Gezira Board, 1989. 
Table C.7. Cost of fertilizer in border prices evaluated at 
the equilibrium exchange rate (E.) for wheat 
Year 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
Border Price Quantity Area in 
at E. in Tons2 Feddans2 
162.3294 
197.8875 
310.0785 
333.9000 
338.7379 
365.6540 
951.0740 
686.7171 
1119. 7240 
26919 
29354 
18925 
12443 
13291 
I 
18713 
15924 
14952 
362504 
366737 
267863 
155760 
265824 
242498 
1 79867 
252313 
Cost/Feddan Ton / Feddan2 Cost 
12.05433 
15.83911 
21 .90760 
26.67384 
16.93664 
73.39214 
60.79649 
66.35454 
0. 471 
0.207 
0.327 
0.597 
0.388 
0 .402 
0.533 
0.474 
(LS/Ton) 
25 . 59307 
76 .51746 
66 . 99572 
44.67980 
43. 65113 
182.56750 
1 14.06470 
139.98840 
Cost/feddan = (Border price o f fertilizerxquantity) / area. 
Cost/ton= (Cost/feddan) /(Ton /feddan ) . 
1. No wheat production in Gezira during the 1985 period. 
2 . Source: Sudan Gezira Board, 1989 . 
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APPENDIX D. STATISTICS ON SUDAN 
Table D.l . Shares of major export commodities in total value 
of exports 
Year 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1 977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
Cotton 
0.61 
0.61 
0.59 
0.55 
0.39 
0.55 
0 . 44 
0.54 
0.61 
0.55 
0.27 
0.21 
0.25 
0 . 49 
0 . 50 
0.44 
0.44 
0 . 30 
0.43 
Ground-
nuts 
0.05 
0.08 
0.08 
0.09 
0 . 19 
0.21 
0.17 
0.15 
0.05 
0 . 02 
0.02 
0 . 01 
0.07 
0 . 02 
0.03 
0.03 
0.00 
0 . 01 
0.04 
Sesame 
0 . 06 
0.07 
0 . 07 
0 . 07 
0 . 13 
0 . 06 
0.10 
0.10 
0.05 
0.07 
0 . 07 
0.11 
0.08 
0.09 
0.12 
0.12 
0.07 
0.09 
0.12 
1. Other Agricultural Tradables. 
Source: El Badawi, 1989. 
Gum 
Arabic 
0.09 
0.07 
0.07 
0.05 
0.10 
0.06 
0.06 
0.06 
0 . 08 
0.07 
0.07 
0.11 
0.08 
0.09 
0.08 
0.08 
0.17 
0.18 
0.12 
Food 
Grains 
0 . 02 
0.03 
0.03 
0.02 
0 . 03 
0.01 
0.03 
0 . 02 
0.02 
0 . 12 
0.15 
0.17 
0.23 
0.09 
0 . 01 
0.00 
0 . 02 
0.17 
0.05 
Live-
stock 
0 . 06 
0 . 07 
0 . 08 
0.07 
0 .05 
0 . 02 
0.04 
0.05 
0.06 
0.06 
0.10 
0.14 
0.13 
0.10 
0 . 12 
0 . 19 
0 . 09 
0.03 
0.06 
Other1 
0.11 
0.07 
0.08 
0.15 
0.11 
0.09 
0.12 
0 .08 
0.13 
0.11 
0.32 
0.25 
0.16 
0.12 
0.15 
0 . 15 
0 . 21 
0.23 
0 . 19 
Table D . 2. Export earnings by major agricultural commodity 
(value in millions of U.S. dollars ) 
Year Cotton Sorghum Ground - Sesame Live- Gum 
nuts stock Arabic 
1978/79 320.70 8.70 25.50 27 . 80 30 . 00 40.00 
1979/80 333.40 68.70 13.20 40.60 35.60 43.90 
1980 / 81 182.00 71.40 55.60 32.20 43.70 32 . 60 
1981 / 82 69.40 64 . 40 48.10 41.70 48.90 43.60 
1982 / 83 581.10 87 . 40 38.10 51.30 128.60 47.50 
1983 / 84 333.20 31.10 44 . 60 45.00 133.30 61.90 
1984/85 245.10 0.00 15 . 00 43.40 197.30 41.60 
1985/ 86 136.00 0.50 6.70 35.10 237.70 27.30 
Source: D'Silva and El Badawi, 1987. 
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Table D.3. Export earnings by subsector (US$ millions) 
Year Traditional Mechanized Irrigated 
Subsector Subsector Subsector 
1978 /79 100.00 23 . 00 332.00 
1979 /80 98 . 00 70.00 358.00 
1980 /81 85.00 72.00 212.00 
1981 /82 129.00 94 . 00 93.00 
1982/83 215.00 117 . 00 599.00 
1983 /84 244.00 60.00 353.00 
1984 /85 261 . 00 30.00 255.00 
1985/86 279.00 20.00 156.00 
Source: D ' Silva and El Badawi, 1987. 
Table D. 4. Estimates of Gross Domestic Product at factor cost, 
current prices' 
Year Agr. 2 Comm. 3 M&M<i T&C' co E&W7 G.S11 0 . S9 GDPIO 
1980 1420 798 327 4 31 181 45 364 506 4072 
1981 1770 1091 379 487 216 92 514 423 4972 
1982 2396 927 369 683 378 76 545 862 6236 
1983 2945 1274 541 930 599 126 726 1190 8331 
1 98 4 3692 1519 688 1137 661 175 955 1587 10417 
1985 4014 1957 985 1495 824 284 1374 1967 12899 
1986 7432 2910 1529 2130 1077 435 2389 2786 20688 
1987 10607 4420 2227 3217 1522 613 3144 4188 29936 
1988 12150 5457 2920 4000 2085 810 4 395 5595 37410 
1. Rounded off to the neare s t decimal. 
2. Agriculture, 3 . Commerce , 4. Manufacturing and Mining , 
5 . Transport and Communication , 6. Construction, 
7. Electricity and Water, 8 . Government Services, 
9. Other Services, 10. Gross Domestic Product . 
Source : Bank of Sudan Annual Reports, various issues . 
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Table D.S. Estimates of Gross Domestic Product at factor cost, 
constant 1980 prices1 
Year Agr. 2 Comm. 3 M&M" T&C5 co E&W 7 G.s . 8 o .s. 9 GD Pm 
1980 1420 798 327 431 181 45 364 506 4072 
1981 1450 893 310 399 177 75 421 348 4072 
1982 1629 630 251 464 257 52 371 586 4239 
1983 1505 651 277 475 306 65 371 609 4259 
1984 1468 603 273 452 262 69 379 630 4137 
1985 1123 547 275 418 231 80 384 550 3608 
1986 1464 573 301 420 212 86 471 549 4 076 
1987 1493 622 314 453 214 86 443 590 4215 
1988 1316 591 316 433 226 88 476 606 4051 
1. Rounded off to the nearest decimal. 
2. Agriculture, 3. Commerce, 4. Manufacturing and Mining, 
5 . Transport and Communication, 6. Construction, 
7 . Electricity and Water, 8. Government Services, 
9. Other Services, 10. Gross Domestic Product . 
Source: Bank of Sudan Annual Reports, various issues . 
Table D.6. Percentage of long staple cotton in the total value 
of cotton exports 
Year Long Staple Other Total Percentage 
Cotton Cotton Value Value of 
Value Quantity Value Quantity Long Staple 
(LS) (Bales ) (LS) (Bales) Cotton 
1980 77894 354729 37547 262363 115441 67 . 48 
1981 46758 199218 21899 144102 68649 68.11 
1982 78845 278349 42285 189715 121130 65.09 
1983 238177 620904 157792 507637 395969 60.15 
1984 294100 501470 155900 465652 450000 65.36 
1985 257756 22 41 00 116504 255214 37 4260 68 .87 
1986 168049 249144 198672 687763 366721 45.82 
1987 230171 377425 225024 561363 455195 50 . 57 
1988 496728 335977 481707 480220 978435 50.77 
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Table D.7 . Current Account of Goods and Services 
(US$ / Millions ) 
Year Imports Invisible od 
Debits 
1980 1238.8 449.0 1687.8 
1981 1795.l 607.2 2402.3 
1982 824 . 7 526.7 1351.4 
1983 772.8 571.7 1344.5 
1984 653.8 459.2 1113.0 
1985 617.3 453.9 1071.2 
1986 683.6 272.8 956.4 
1987 763 . 5 323.0 1086.5 
1988 1019.4 341.3 1360.7 
Od = Imports+Invisible Debits 
05 = Exports+Invisible Credits 
Exports Invisible 
Credits 
689.4 550.2 
792.7 792.9 
400.9 622.9 
514.2 540. 9 
519. 0 545.1 
444.2 634.9 
326.8 318.l 
265.0 325.9 
427.0 387.9 
Os 
1239.6 
1584.9 
1023.8 
1055.l 
1064.l 
1079.l 
644.9 
590.9 
814 . 9 
Source: IMF Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund. 
Table D.8 . Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
Year CPI 
(base year 1980) 
1980 100.00 
1981 123.67 
1982 156.71 
1983 206.33 
1984 269.77 
1985 397.03 
1986 509 . 60 
1987 632.15 
1988 927 . 05 
Source: Hassan, 1989. 
